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ABSTRACT 
The sun is setting on the days when multinationals could 
establish intricate tax systems to drastically reduce their tax bills. 
Since the 1990s, the OECD and the EU have taken resolute steps to 
compel their members to eradicate corporate tax elusion and 
harmful tax competition. These solutions are forward-looking, and 
aim at averting future issues. Importantly, the European 
Commission has picked up a fight against past tax schemes by 
targeting tax rulings via State aid, a part of EU competition law. In 
the most publicized case, Apple was asked to pay US$15 billion to 
Ireland in outstanding taxes. The decision was annulled by the 
General Court in July 2020, and an appeal before the Court of 
Justice is currently pending. This Article assesses the value of State 
aid law as a tool to fight unfair corporate taxation. It does so by 
scrutinizing the decisional practice of the Commission and the 
judgments of the General Court. The point of departure is that it is 
legitimate to resort to State aid rules to monitor tax planning 
practices. While the Commission faces an uphill struggle to win 
individual cases, the general principles and strategy delineated by 
the investigations serve to enhance deterrence and decrease 
undesirable predictability. Unintendedly, the Commission’s losses 
reinforce the robustness of judicial review, and serve to question the 
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narrative that EU competition law may be strategically applied 
against US tech giants. Overall, the Article perceives State aid as a 
useful weapon to combat corporate tax malpractices, but as a 
complement, not a substitute, of the preferred tax harmonization 
strategy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 15, 2020, the tech giant Apple grabbed headlines 
around the world when it won a highly publicized legal battle 
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against the European Commission (“EC” or “Commission”).1 Four 
years earlier, in the summer of 2016, the EC’s Directorate General 
for Competition (“DG Comp”) announced that certain tax benefits 
granted to the company in Ireland fell afoul of the European 
Union’s (“EU”) State aid rules. Apple would thus be required to 
pay over EU€13 billion (over US$15 billion) to the Irish Tax and 
Customs Administration (“Irish Revenue”).2 
The whopping amount is the tax calculated to have been 
underpaid over more than two decades by virtue of an alleged 
preferential arrangement on corporate taxation. This “sweetheart 
deal,” granted via two tax rulings,3 allowed Apple to dodge 
significant amounts of income tax by exploiting a loophole 
between the laws of Ireland and the United States. During a press 
conference held on the day the decision was issued, the EU’s 
Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager illustratively 
explained that “for every million euro in profits, [Apple] paid just 
500 euros in taxes.”4 The infinitesimal amount may be enough to 
get anyone’s back up, and yet on appeal the General Court of the 
EU (“GC”) annulled the EC’s decision on the basis that the 
competition watchdog had failed to demonstrate the existence of 
a fundamental requirement for the application of State aid rules: a 
selective competitive advantage.5 
As soon as the judgment was announced, commentators 
rushed to weigh in on the outcome. Luis Garicano, Member of the 
European Parliament, described it as a “huge setback,” and one 
which implies that the state aid route is “essentially dead.”6 In a 
similar vein, Professor Ruth Mason of the University of Virginia 
 
1. Cases T-778/16 & T-892/16, Ir. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, paras. 505-507 
(July 15, 2020) [hereinafter Apple Judgment]. 
2. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal 
Tax Benefits to Apple Worth up to €13 billion (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm [https://perma.cc/4AAT-
795L] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020); Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of Aug. 30, 2016 
on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN0) (ex 2014/CP) Implemented by Ireland 
to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L 187) 1, 109 [hereinafter Apple Decision]. 
3. Apple Decision, supra note 2. 
4. The video of the press conference is available at https://youtu.be/y2gTeRdiKtQ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZMH-EDYV] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020). 
5. Apple Judgment, supra note 1. 
6. Javier Espinoza et al., EU Refuses to Admit Defeat after Apple Tax Setback, FIN. 
TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6cc18c26-04e0-410d-9c0a-
3f1baf1a1685 [https://perma.cc/9QZP-Y858]. 
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called it a “major blow to the Commission’s plan to use state aid to 
combat tax avoidance,” but she agreed with the Apple win on the 
substance given the deficiencies in the EC’s legal arguments.7 The 
ruling would not have sent shockwaves among those acquainted 
with the previous case law. Yet these statements may somewhat 
overestimate the crushing potential of the judgment on the 
prospect of relying on State aid rules to target direct corporate 
taxation. The GC makes it abundantly clear that it is indeed 
possible for tax rulings to violate EU State aid law, a point it had 
already clarified in the Fiat and Starbucks judgments of 
September 2019.8 The Commission was thus vindicated on the 
main issue, but is not ready to throw in the towel just yet. On 
September 25, 2020, it announced that it would appeal the 
judgment, arguing that the GC “made a number of errors of law.”9 
The present Article goes beyond the media hype, and intends 
to assess the value of State aid as a tool to fight corporate tax 
avoidance and harmful tax competition. To do so, it scrutinizes 
the decisions adopted by the EC, and the outcome of three appeals 
against this line of decisional practice: those relating to the tax 
rulings in favor of Fiat in Luxembourg,10 Starbucks in the 
Netherlands,11 and Apple in Ireland.12 The main argument, and 
point of departure, is that both the EC and the GC are correct in 
lending support to the legitimacy of the use of this legal 
framework to monitor the tax planning practices of 
multinationals. While adopting legislation might be the optimal 
approach to solve future issues, State aid presents a unique 
opportunity to tackle past problematic schemes. In doing so, it 
 
7. Ruth Mason, @ProfRuthMason, TWITTER (July 16, 2020 11:34 AM), 
https://twitter.com/ProfRuthMason/status/1283787004854009858 
[https://perma.cc/S8PG-VH4H]. 
8. Cases T-755/15 & T-759/15, Lux. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:670, para. 45 
(Sept. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Fiat Judgment]; Cases T-760/15 & T-636/16, Neth. v. 
Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, para. 65 (Sept. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Starbucks 
Judgment]. 
9. European Commission, Statement by Executive Vice-President Margrethe 
Vestager on the Commission’s Decision to Appeal the General Court’s Judgment on the 
Apple Tax State Aid Case in Ireland (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_1746 
[https://perma.cc/9PJ9-LPLY]. 
10. Fiat Judgment, supra note 8. 
11. Starbucks Judgment, supra note 8. 
12. Apple Judgment, supra note 1. 
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affords the EC significant enforcement discretion, and provides a 
much-needed boost to deterrence in relation to practices of 
debatable benefits beyond the pockets of the beneficiaries.13 The 
Article thus perceives State aid as a useful weapon to combat tax 
malpractices, as a complement, not a substitute, of the preferred 
tax law harmonization strategy. 
The Article weighs in on the GC’s fairly contentious yet 
cautious embrace of the arm’s length principle (“ALP”) for 
deciding whether an advantage that would not have been 
obtained under the ordinary tax system has been granted via a 
tax ruling. Not only did the Commission win on the substance, it 
also succeeded in pressuring the countries under investigation to 
change their tax laws so as to prevent the issues it set out to 
quash in the first place.14 Unintendedly, the publicized 
Commission’s losses have further shone a light on the robustness 
of EU judicial review, and cast doubt on the technology 
protectionism narrative—the view that EU competition law is 
being strategically applied against US tech giants so as to favor EU 
rivals. Despite these positive outcomes, if the State aid route is to 
be viewed as a long-term strategy, the Commission needs to do its 
very best to actually triumph. This necessarily entails paying 
more attention to detail in order to attempt to meet the 
evidentiary burden required to tear down the selective advantage 
brick wall. 
To explore these fundamental issues, Part II provides an 
introduction to State aid rules, a pivotal part of competition law in 
the European context. Part III discusses tax rulings and the 
(controversial) tax deals they sometimes endorse. Part IV covers 
 
13. A study of the impact of the tax advantages on the economies of those countries 
that offer beneficial corporate tax rates is beyond the scope of this study. A common 
argument is that countries offering tax incentives might foster job creation and thus 
increase their wealth. The figures in this regard do not necessarily lend support to this 
view. See, e.g., CENT. STAT. OFF., HOUSEHOLD FIN. & CONSUMPTION SURV., INCOME & WEALTH 
INFO (2013-2018), https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-
hfcs/householdfinanceandconsumptionsurvey2018/incomeandwealthinequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/UAE9-EFKN] (blaming inter alia low wages and weak worker 
protection on wealth and income inequality). See Elaine Edwards, Irish Inequality Blamed 
on “Unusually High” Levels of Low Pay and Weak Protections, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/irish-inequality-blamed-on-unusually-
high-levels-of-low-pay-and-weak-protections-1.3798081 [https://perma.cc/6HMD-
4X97]. 
14. See infra Part III.C. 
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the application of State aid provisions to tax rulings, focusing on 
the Fiat, Starbucks and Apple cases. Part V critically discusses the 
adequacy and repercussions of these developments, and the 
suitability of State aid legislation to tackle detrimental tax 
competition and tax avoidance. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. STATE AID AND COMPETITION 
For multinationals, the EC’s use of State aid legislation to 
dismantle their complex corporate tax avoidance systems may 
have given a whole new meaning to Ronald Reagan’s assertion 
that the most terrifying words in the English language are “I’m 
from the Government and I’m here to help.”15 To grasp why the 
“Government help” some of them have been receiving by virtue of 
tax rulings may be declared unlawful, it is necessary to 
understand the relevant legal framework. The task here is to 
provide an understanding of the same.16 It is worth noting that, 
while the scrutiny of tax rulings under State aid law is a relatively 
new phenomenon, the EC has been relying on these rules to 
assess certain tax-related issues for decades, despite the fact that 
the EU has no competence over direct taxation.17 Some of the 
decisional practice and case law in this respect will be discussed 
where relevant. 
A. State Aid Law: a European Affair? 
State aid rules are embedded in the EU’s competition law 
regime, and represent one of its most distinctive features. Unlike 
in other parts of the world, in Europe it is possible to avert 
 
15. Remarks to Representatives of the Future Farmers of America, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
994, 995 (July 28, 1988). 
16. Those looking for a comprehensive study of State aid law should consult some 
of these sources: STATE AID LAW AND BUSINESS TAXATION (Isabelle Richelle et al. eds., 
Springer 2016); CONOR QUIGLEY, EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW AND POLICY (Hart Publ’g, 3d ed., 
2015); EU STATE AID LAW: EMERGING TRENDS AT THE NATIONAL AND EU LEVEL (Pier L. Parcu 
et al. eds., Edward Elgar 2020); State Aid Law of the European Union (Herwig C. H. 
Hoffmann et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2016); CLAIRE MICHEAU, STATE AID, SUBSIDY AND 
TAX INCENTIVES UNDER EU AND WTO LAW (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2014); EUGENE STUART & IANA 
ROGINSKA-GREEN, SIXTY YEARS OF EU STATE AID LAW AND POLICY: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2018); Lisa Paterno, State Aid and Fiscal Protectionism in the European 
Union from the Perspective of Competitors, 65 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 343 (2011). 
17. LIZA L. GORMSEN, EUROPEAN STATE AID AND TAX RULINGS 144 (2019). 
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potentially harmful State intervention in the competitive process. 
This includes not only the concession of State aid, but also certain 
privileges granted to public undertakings18 which may in effect 
shield them from the competition exerted by the private sector.19 
In 1994, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann described the “loneliness” of the 
EC when applying State aid rules: “[t]here are no models and no 
precedents, there is little academic debate, and the contrast with 
antitrust is remarkable.”20 Indeed, there are no equivalent 
provisions in the United States, where the main antitrust 
statutes—the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1917—
focus almost exclusively on joint anticompetitive conduct, 
harmful monopolistic behavior, and the scrutiny of mergers.21 
From a competition policy standpoint, the desire to control 
distortions of competition that are a product of the assistance 
granted by State entities to firms competing in the marketplace is 
understandable. Evidently, such aid could furnish those on the 
receiving end with an unfair competitive advantage over their 
rivals.22 If antitrust is made up of the “laws which make artificial 
restraints of competition illegal,”23 then arguably State support 
could restrain other players’ ability to compete, and should be 
controlled. Interestingly, it is also possible to find attempts to 
curb subsidies in transnational regimes, most notably the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).24 In the Uruguay Round of 1994, the 
 
18. Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner v. Macrotron GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, para. 21 
(Apr. 23, 1991) (defining undertakings, subjects of EU competition law, as “entities 
engaged in an economic activity regardless of their legal status and how they are 
financed”). 
19. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Functioning of 
the European Union art. 106, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 51 [hereinafter TFEU] (art. 
106 is the provision applicable to public undertakings). 
20. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aids under European Community Competition 
Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 410, 411 (1994). Note however that in April 2018, the UK 
Government confirmed its intention to transpose EU state aid legislation into UK law, and 
therefore the provisions look set to remain relevant and applicable in the UK despite 
Brexit. 
21. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914). 
22. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Competition Policy in Subsidies and 
State Aid, at 7-10 DAFFE/CLP (2001) 24 (Nov. 21, 2001). 
23. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPLIANCE MANUALS FOR THE NEW 
ANTITRUST ERA 198 (1990). 
24. The WTO deals with trade rules between nations. See WORLD TRADE ORG. 
https://www.wto.org [https://perma.cc/NX8W-9Y7E] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020). A 
discussion of the relevant WTO rules is beyond the scope of this paper. See Roman 
Grynberg & Bridget Chilala, WTO Compatibility of the OECD Defensive Measures against 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 25 established 
an Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
applicable to all WTO members.26 WTO legislation is binding on 
the Member States of the EU.27 As a result, the support granted by 
the EU Member States may be doubly scrutinized, since it must be 
compatible with both State aid and WTO rules. 
The basic EU State aid legislation was introduced in 1957 by 
the Treaty of Rome, currently referred to as the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).28 This Treaty 
created the European Economic Community—the seed of what 
we now know as the EU—and triggered an unprecedented 
process of integration in the Old Continent. Only six countries 
originally ratified the TFEU (then called the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”) Treaty). Yet the EU has expanded over the 
years, and currently encompasses twenty-seven sovereign 
nations. State aid rules are inextricably linked to that market-
integration objective, and have been considered a fundamental 
“vehicle for making the completion of the internal market 
politically acceptable.”29 Allowing antitrust enforcers to control 
the anticompetitive effects of State aid may be beneficial for the 
protection of competition in any given context. However, it is 
particularly valuable within the policy framework envisioned to 
assist in the plight to remove obstacles to trade in an 
economically unified region. These integrationist aspirations that 
permeate EU competition law justify in part the divergence with 
the US system. In the words of Helmuth Schröter: 
. . . the much broader scope of and plurality of aims pursued 
by [EU] competition policy result in making antitrust analysis 
 
Harmful Tax Competition, 2 J. WORLD INV. 507 (2001); MICHEAU, supra note 16; Lucas 
Bastin, Transfer Pricing and the WTO, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 59 (2014); LUCA RUBINI, THE 
DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
26. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 14, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/PR8U-BS8L] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
27. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 216(2). 
28. TFEU, supra note 19. 
29. Andrew Evans & Stephen Martin, Socially Acceptable Distortions of Competition: 
Community Policy on State Aid, 16 EUR. L. REV. 79, 110 (1991). 
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under [Union] law a more complicated process than under 
the antitrust law of the United States which considers 
“allocative efficiency/consumer welfare” as the sole valid 
standard.30 
State aid may be a regulatory policy, but one “with a 
difference.”31 Since there was practically no Council legislation in 
the area until the late 1990s, it evolved as a Commission-made 
strategy.32 The EC applied the Treaty provisions in specific 
investigations, subject to the scrutiny of the European courts.33 
This distinctiveness is perhaps a recognition that this area is, on 
the one hand, “crucial for the building and consolidation of the 
internal market,” and on the other hand also “raises extremely 
sensitive issues for the EU’s member states.”34 Moreover, given 
the wide discretion afforded to the EC, it is arguably “one of the 
most politicised of the EU’s regulatory policies,” which allows the 
EU to take action to intervene when national governments 
attempt to pursue industrial policies protecting national 
interests.35 An unavoidable consequence is that State aid is an 
area of tension and conflict, because it “pits the Commission 
directly against one or more of the member states” in a 
sovereignty battle.36 The recent cases relating to the tax deals of 
multinationals further show that these tensions can extend 
beyond the borders of the Union. 
It is difficult to compare EU competition law and US antitrust 
at the best of times, given the different contextual roots, purposes, 
evolution, ideology and procedure.37 However, when it comes to 
the State aid sphere, it is simply impossible to draw comparisons. 
 
30. Helmuth R. B. Schröter, Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3), in 1987 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 645, 661 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988). 
31. Michelle Cini, From Soft Law to Hard Law: Discretion and Rule-Making in the 
Commission’s State Aid Regime, 7 (EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/35, 2000). 
32. Id. 
33. Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 388 
(1998); Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, 3 
(EUI Working Paper LAW 93/5, 1993). 
34. Cini, supra note 31, at 3. 
35. Id. at 8. 
36. Tim Büthe, The Politics of Competition and Institutional Change in European 
Union: The First Fifty Years, in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION VOL. 8, MAKING HISTORY: 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AT FIFTY 186, 189 (Sophie Meunier & 
Kathleen R. McNamara eds., 2017). 
37. See, e.g., Sandra Marco Colino, The Antitrust “F” Word: Fairness Considerations in 
Competition Law, J. BUS. L. 329 (2019). 
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Since the raison d’être of these rules is based on the market 
integration ambition, they can be a difficult pill to swallow for 
non-EU firms who might be less sensitive to the importance of a 
robust internal market. Even within the Union, the application of 
State aid law frequently leads to jurisdictional tensions, because 
the measures targeted by the EC are at times embedded in areas 
considered to be of sole national concern. Needless to say, tax is 
one of those contentious battlegrounds, as discussed later.38 
B. Competition Concerns 
Aid schemes flourish when crises hit. In the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, governments all over the world have been 
digging deep into their pockets to prevent companies, even entire 
industries, from collapse.39 And there is very good reason for 
coming to the rescue. The undesirable social consequences of 
companies exiting the market, including a higher unemployment 
rate, may be spared. But even without an economic crunch in 
sight, incentives might well be required for a myriad of reasons, 
such as invigorating a specific activity, encouraging firms to adopt 
environmentally friendly policies, or enabling structural 
reforms.40 
Evidently, subsidies may be perfectly compatible with EU 
State aid law. Even laissez-faire champion Reagan admitted that in 
some circumstances subsidies are necessary, for instance in cases 
 
38. See infra Part IV. 
39. See, e.g., USDA Announces Coronavirus Food Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/04/17/usda-
announces-coronavirus-food-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/4ZCZ-PFDB]; Simon 
Clarke, £20 Million in New Grants to Boost Recovery of Small Businesses, UK MINISTRY 
HOUSING, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/20-million-in-new-grants-to-boost-recovery-of-
small-businesses [https://perma.cc/V5XV-9SRX]; Anti-Epidemic Fund, GOV’T HONG KONG 
SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION,  https://www.coronavirus.gov.hk/eng/anti-epidemic-fund.html 
[https://perma.cc/6UPQ-QAZV] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020); Sebastian Lange et al., 
German Covid-19-Related Grants and Subsidies, DELOITTE (May 5, 2020), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/dl/en/pages/legal/articles/foerdermoeglichkeiten-
wirtschaft-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/3Z7W-35SD]; Morten Bennedsen et al., 
Understanding the Impact of Government Aid to Firms in the COVID-19 Pandemic, CTR. FOR 
ECON. POL’Y RSCH. (June 18, 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/impact-government-aid-
firms-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/VE6N-5G2C]. 
40. SANDRA MARCO COLINO, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK (7th ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2019). 
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of “natural disasters like the drought.”41 However, he advocated 
for a “future where there is less, not more, government in our 
daily lives,” and generally defended that the best way forward 
was “to get government out of the way” and let competition work 
its magic.42 While his reasoning does not resonate with the logic 
behind the EU regime, his bottom line serves to justify the 
existence of State aid law: there may be undesirable effects on the 
competitive process derived from supportive State measures, 
hence the need for legislation with the potential to neutralize 
those negative outcomes. 
The rationale for the inclusion of rules relating to State aid 
within a system designed to protect competition is 
straightforwardly explained on the EC’s website: “[a] company 
which receives government support gains an advantage over its 
competitors. Therefore, the [TFEU] generally prohibits State aid 
unless it is justified by reasons of general economic 
development.”43 Since competition law is about ensuring a level 
playing field, two issues arise in relation to supportive measures. 
The first is that they could give the recipients an unfair advantage 
over their competitors. This is more likely to happen when the aid 
is granted to specific companies rather than an industry as a 
whole. Kelyn Bacon explains that, where the edge attained by a 
company is the fruit of a subsidy instead of a better performance 
in the market, the integrity of the single market could be affected. 
Moreover, if a Member State chooses to subsidize a national firm, 
others may wish to follow suit and offer comparable benefits to 
their own national companies, thus triggering what Bacon 
describes as a “subsidy race.”44 The threat to integration of such 
races meant that state aid was a “political imperative” at the 
outset of the process.45 Nonetheless, this problem is somewhat 
 
41. Remarks to Representatives of the Future Farmers of America, supra note 15, at 
995. 
42. Id. 
43. See State aid control, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FE4-U8PB] (last visited July 22, 2020). 
44. KELYN BACON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF STATE AID 9 (3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2017); James Langenfeld & Christopher Alexander, State Aid and Supply-Side Geographic 
Market Definition, 12 EUR. STATE AID L. Q. 362, 362 (2013). 
45. BACON, supra note 44, at 9. 
2020] THE LONG ARM OF STATE AID LAW 401 
less pressing nowadays, because the single market is a reality and 
not all subsidy races have negative consequences.46 
The second issue relates to economic efficiency, considered 
the main goal of competition policy.47 The effects of state aid on 
efficiency greatly depend on the circumstances. In some cases, it 
might be helpful to provide support, particularly in concentrated 
markets where subsidizing the production of small firms or 
newcomers may counterbalance the existing market power. At 
the same time, subsidies may artificially keep unproductive, 
poorly managed firms in the market, and this would result in 
inefficiency. From a static perspective, such a situation could 
crystallize “inefficient industry structures; it may crowd out 
private investment; it may reduce effective competition by 
increasing market power or by reducing the incentives to 
compete; it may distort production and location decisions across 
Member States; and it may foster overly risky or otherwise 
inefficient behaviour.”48 And from a dynamic perspective, it could 
also “help perpetuate failed business models, reduce incentive to 
compete, and create moral hazard by encouraging excessive risk-
taking.”49 
It follows from the above that State aid is not always 
detrimental, but does require close monitoring to curb its 
potential harmful effects on competition and, in the European 
context, on integration. This imposes on the EC the arduous task 
of weeding out potentially harmful aid from the (majority of) 
beneficial support. There are frequent disagreements between 
 
46. Id. 
47. According to the OECD, “[t]here is general consensus that the basic objective of 
competition policy is to protect and preserve competition as the most appropriate means 
of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources—and thus efficient market outcomes—in 
free market economies.” Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Interim Report on 
Convergence of Competition Policies, at para. 4, OECD/GD (94) 64 (June 1994). There is 
extensive literature on this topic. See, e.g., Valentine Korah, EEC Competition Policy—
Legal Form or Economic Efficiency?, 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 85 (1986); Gregory T. 
Gundlach & Diana Moss, The Role of Efficiencies in Antitrust Law: Introduction and 
Overview, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 91 (2015); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other 
than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA L. REV. 1191 (1977); Ioannis 
Lianos, Competition Law for a Complex Economy, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 643 (2019); Pieter Kalbfleisch, Aiming for Consumer Alliance: Competition Law and 
Consumer Welfare, 2 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 108 (2011). 
48. BACON, supra note 44, at 10. 
49. Id. at 11. 
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the EC and the European courts as to what constitutes unlawful 
aid. While originally the application of State aid rules focused 
mainly on avoiding distortions within the EU, and dealing with the 
risks of protectionism (particularly of national champions) for the 
creation of a single market, this is currently less pressing. Now 
that it has been able to move beyond the market integration 
imperative, the EC has begun looking at a broader range of 
measures. That is how the State aid road eventually led to the 
scrutiny tax rulings, a pivotal pursuit nowadays.50 
C. The EU Rules on State Aid 
In the early days of the EEC, the Commission had to devote 
its (limited) resources to chiseling its general competition policy. 
It focused mainly on its approach to joint anticompetitive 
conduct, and to a lesser extent on single-firm abusive practices. It 
was in the mid 1980s, almost three decades after the Treaty of 
Rome was signed, when it could afford to look towards the 
application of State aid rules. Since then, State aid policy has 
blossomed. There is currently a specialized section within DG 
Comp—Directorate H, composed of six units—which deals with 
State aid cases. The Deputy Director-General for State aid is 
Carles Esteva Mosso, an experienced Commission official with a 
background in law, economics and political science.51 
1. General Legal Framework 
The main Treaty provisions on State aid can be found in 
Articles 107 to 109 TFEU. Article 107(1) is of vital importance, 
and contains a blanket prohibition of aid favoring specific 
companies (or “undertakings” in EU terminology)52 unless they 
fall into a particular exception. Article 108 TFEU compels the EC 
to keep all systems of aid “under constant review,” and to do so in 
 
50. See infra Part IV. 
51. Directorate General for Competition, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/directory/organi_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PY7H-7U24]. 
52. According to the CJ, “the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity 
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in 
which it is financed.” Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, para. 21 (Apr. 23, 1991). 
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cooperation with the Member States.53 The EC can eliminate or 
modify the aid it considers problematic,54 and has the power to 
adopt block exemptions.55 In exceptional circumstances, the 
Council may, at the request of a Member State, declare illegal aid 
as being lawful, always subject to judicial review.56 The Member 
States must inform the Commission if they plan to grant or alter 
aid.57 Article 109 TFEU enables the Council: (1) to adopt the 
regulations required for the application of 107 and 108; (2) to 
determine the categories of aid that may be lawful; and (3) to 
define the conditions for legality.58 
These rules are accompanied by a body of extensive 
secondary legislation and soft law which expands the legal 
principles applicable to the scrutiny of aid.59 Among them are 
Regulation 2015/1589 (on procedure),60 Regulation 615/2014 
(the block exemption),61 and the Notion of State Aid Notice.62 This 
Notice provides valuable guidance for the application of Article 
107 to tax rulings. The provisions that make up the State aid legal 
framework legislation are “riddled with exceptions which attempt 
to strike a balance between the protection of competition on the 
one hand, and the right of the Member States to act in defence of a 
wide range of legitimate interests on the other.”63 
 
53. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 108. 
54. Id.  art. 108(2). 
55. Id. art. 108(4). Block exemptions are pieces of EU legislation which 
“automatically bring certain categories of conduct within the terms of [the TFEU], 
preventing the need to conduct case-by-case analysis” (in this case of specific aid 
granted). MARCO COLINO, supra note 40, at 253. 
56. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 108(2). 
57. Id. art. 108(3). 
58. Id. art. 109. 
59. Secondary legislation is enacted by the EU institutions to develop the 
“principles and objectives set out in the treaties”. See EU Law, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/law_en [https://perma.cc/H2JD-ZGHN] (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2020). 
60. Council Regulation 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 Laying Down Detailed Rules for 
the Application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2015 O.J. (L 248) 9, 9. 
61. Commission Regulation 615/2014 of 17 June 2014, Declaring Certain 
Categories of Aid Compatible with the Internal Market in Application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2014 O.J. (L 187) 1. 
62. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 262) 1. 
63. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40, at 495. 
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2. The Prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU 
The fundamental EU State aid provision can be found in 
Article 107(1) TFEU: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by 
a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market. 
In the Altmark case,64 the Court of Justice (“CJ”) referenced 
four conditions required for the application of this prohibition: 
First, there must be an intervention by the State or through 
State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to 
affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer an 
advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten 
to distort competition.65 
An additional requisite recognized by the EU judiciary is that 
the advantage conferred must be selective. According to the CJ, 
“the requirement as to selectivity under 107(1) must be clearly 
distinguished from the concomitant detection of an economic 
advantage.”66 However, in practice selectivity is often analyzed 
“as a dimension of the advantage criterion.”67 These requirements 
need to be interpreted taking into account the Notion of State Aid 
Notice,68 and the relevant case law. They are discussed below. 
a. “Intervention by the State or through State Resources” 
According to the Notion of State Aid Notice, for aid to be of 
State origin it must be both granted directly or indirectly through 
 
64. Case C–280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, 2003 
E.C.R. I–7810. 
65. Id. at I-7836. 
66. Case C–15/14, Comm’n v. MOL Magyar Olaj-és Gázipari Nyrt, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:32, para. 59 (Jan. 22, 2015). In this sense, Ruth Mason considers 
selectivity as a fifth condition for the application of Article 107(1) TFEU. See Ruth Mason, 
Tax Rulings as State Aid FAQ, 154 TAX NOTES  451, 452 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
67. Wolf Sauter, The Criterion of Advantage in State Aid: Altmark and Services of 
General Economic Interest, in TILEC DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2014-05 1, 2 (2014). 
68. See Council Regulation 2015/1589, supra note 60. 
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State resources, and imputable to the State.69 With regard to the 
first condition, the financial burden of the advantage gained ought 
to be borne by the State.70 The term “State” here is subject to a 
broad interpretation, and comprises intra-state entities71 or 
public undertakings.72 In principle, this would mean that 
measures funded by private companies fall outside the scope of 
the prohibition.73 Yet there are situations in which the EU 
judiciary has recognized that the resources of private bodies 
might be problematic, for instance where the private funds are 
managed under the instructions of a government,74 and “they 
constantly remain under public control and therefore available to 
the competent national authorities.”75 The EC’s view, as explained 
in the Notion of State Aid Notice, is that “the origin of the 
resources is not relevant provided that, before being directly or 
indirectly transferred to the beneficiaries, they come under public 
control and are therefore available to the national authorities, 
even if the resources do not become the property of the public 
authority.”76 However, the Notice is not binding, and it is not yet 
clear the extent to which the European courts will support this 
very broad interpretation. 
It is important to note that those state resources have to be 
transferred, that is, the public funds must be handed over to a 
company.77 But the concept of transfer also encompasses 
“waiv[ing] revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the 
Treasury.”78 It does not catch assurances of support, if these 
never materialize.79 The Notion of State Aid Notice explains that: 
 
69. Id. para. 38. 
70. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40. 
71. Examples include regional and federal bodies. 
72. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40. 
73. Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-2159. 
74. See, e.g., Case C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord BV v. Aluminium Delfzijl BV, 
2008 E.C.R. I-5497 case C–206/06 [2008] 3 CMLR 32; Case T-47/15, Germany v. Comm’n, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:281 (May 10, 2016). 
75. Case C-262/12, Ass’n Vent de Colère! Fédération Nationale v. Ministre de 
l’Écologie, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 21 (Dec. 19, 2013). 
76. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 57. 
77. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40. 
78. Case T-67/94, Ladbroke Racing Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R II–1, para. II-45. 
79. Case C-81/10, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2011:811 (Dec. 8, 
2011). 
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The transfer of State resources may take many forms, such as 
direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the 
capital of companies and benefits in kind. A firm and concrete 
commitment to make State resources available at a later 
point in time is also considered a transfer of State resources. 
A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; foregoing 
State revenue is sufficient. Waiving revenue which would 
otherwise have been paid to the State constitutes a transfer 
of State resources. For example, a “shortfall” in tax and social 
security revenue due to exemptions or reductions in taxes or 
social security contributions granted by the Member State, or 
exemptions from the obligation to pay fines or other 
pecuniary penalties, fulfils the State resources requirement of 
Article 107(1) [TFEU]. The creation of a concrete risk of 
imposing an additional burden on the State in the future, by a 
guarantee or by a contractual offer, is sufficient for the 
purposes of Article 107(1).80 
The second requirement, State imputability, was laid down 
by the CJ in the Stardust Marine case.81 It does not necessarily 
require demonstrating that a public authority instructed a 
company to adopt a measure, and in some cases this might be 
inferred from the circumstances. According to the Notion of State 
Aid Notice, aid is imputable to the state where a public authority 
grants some kind of advantage, or where it designates a body to 
administer a measure giving an advantage. When the aid is 
provided by a public undertaking which grants, the degree to 
which public authorities were behind the adoption of the measure 
needs to be determined.82 Moreover, the decision to grant aid 
must be unilateral and autonomous.83 This implies that a measure 
will not be imputable to the state if it is merely complying with 
“obligations stemming from the Treaty,” unless there is some 
discretion.84 
 
80. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 51. 
81. Case C-482/99, France v. Comm’n (Stardust Marine Case), ECLI:EU:C:2002:294 
(May 16, 2002). 
82. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, paras. 39-40. 
83. Case T-351/02, Deutsche Bahn AG v Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2006:104, paras. 2, 
100. 
84. Id. para. 102. 
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b. “Liable to Affect Trade Between Member States” 
In line with the TFEU’s other competition law provisions, 
Article 107 only applies where there is an effect on trade between 
the countries that form part of the Union.85 The logic behind this 
constraint is purely jurisdictional. The EU can only act in those 
areas where it is empowered to do so by the Treaty, and 
everything else remains governed by the national laws of its 
members.86 Given that the main aim of the Treaty is to foster 
economic integration, the European institutions have powers to 
act in those areas that can affect the proper functioning of the 
internal market. As explained in the Hugin case: 
[Union] law covers any agreement or any practice which is 
capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between 
Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment 
of the objectives of a single market between the Member 
Estates, in particular by partitioning the national markets or 
by affecting the structure of competition within the [Internal] 
Market. On the other hand conduct the effects of which are 
confined to the territory of a single Member State is governed 
by the national legal order.87 
In State aid, the determining factor is whether the support 
potentially88 bolsters the position of an undertaking vis-à-vis its 
competitors when it comes to trading within the EU.89 Since all 
that is required is that the aid is liable to affect trade and distort 
competition,90 this condition can be met even if the beneficiaries 
do not export goods or services. Their size and the amount of aid 
granted are irrelevant, as long as the chance to penetrate national 
markets is reduced.91 
 
85. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 107. 
86. Case C-22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R 1870, 1870. 
87. Id. 
88. An actual effect is not required. See Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. 
Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, 2003 E.C.R. I-7810; Case C-518/13, Eventech Ltd. v. 
The Parking Adjudicator, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9 (Jan. 14, 2015); Joined Cases C-197/11 & C-
203/11, Libert v. Gouvernement Flamand, ECLI:EU:C:2013:288 (May 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter Libert]. 
89. Case T-298/97, Mauro v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-2325. 
90. Libert, supra note 88, para. 48. 
91. Id. para. 78. 
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c. “Distort or Threaten to Distort Competition” 
“[I]nextricably linked” to the effect on trade between the 
Member States is the notion of restriction of competition,92 and 
the assessment of the two requirements usually goes hand in 
hand. Both the TFEU and the Notion of State Aid Notice specify 
that potential threats to competition may be caught. All that is 
required is that the aid be “liable to improve the competitive 
position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with 
which it competes.”93 
d. “Confer a [Selective] Advantage” 
Indisputably, the most contested element of the prohibition 
contained in Article 107(1) TFEU is the requirement that the aid 
must favor specific undertakings. The case law and decisional 
practice of the EC have clarified that the aid must constitute an 
advantage, and that advantage must be conferred displaying a 
degree of selectivity.94 This Section assesses these two complex 
yet fundamental requisites. Perhaps the best way to explain the 
difference between advantage and selectivity is to note that to 
assess the former it is necessary to compare the aid under 
scrutiny with the usual treatment given in similar situations, 
whereas for the latter it is the actual treatment that Member 
States grant other undertakings in a comparable situation that is 
relevant.95 
The EC tends to look at whether “the recipient undertaking 
receives an economic advantage which it would not have 
obtained under normal market conditions.”96 The key issue is 
thus whether the aid places the undertaking in a position it would 
not have had achieved had it been subject to competition in the 
market. This parameter casts a very wide net, and requires an 
 
92. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 186. 
93. Id. para. 187. 
94. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40. 
95. José Luis Buendía, Are Tax Rulings Selective, TAX & STATE AID IBC CONF. (2016), 
https://slideplayer.com/slide/14123071/ [https://perma.cc/35HD-GYWE] (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2020). See also Alfonso Lamadrid, Fiscal State Aid in Court: Recent Developments, 
GARRIGUES (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QQSkusO1u40J:https://antitr
ustlair.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/fiscal-state-aid-in-court-
a.lamadrid.pptx+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://perma.cc/FB9M-WNTR]. 
96. Case C-39-94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. I-3577, I-3596. 
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analysis of the counterfactual, that is, of the recipient’s position in 
the absence of the aid. The most obvious measures would be 
positive benefits, or actual transfers of funds. However, reducing 
certain economic burdens, thereby mitigating “the charges which 
are normally included in the budget of an undertaking” has a 
similar effect.97 This second category is relevant for the tax 
rulings discussed in this Article. In this regard, the CJ has 
confirmed that a tax exemption which “places the persons to 
whom it applies in a more favourable financial situation than 
other taxpayers” may be problematic.98 
The general principles for assessing the existence of an 
advantage have been developed by the EU judiciary and are 
summarized in the Notion of State Aid Notice.99 In public 
investment matters, the market economy investor principle 
(“MEIP”), or market investor test, is particularly important.100 
According to the MEIP, an investment will not amount to State aid 
when it would be acceptable to a private investor under normal 
market economy conditions.101 
For Article 107(1) to kick in, it is further necessary that 
“certain undertakings or categories of undertakings or . . . certain 
economic sectors” are advantaged “in a selective way.”102 
Selectivity entails a differentiated treatment, and may occur even 
if the measure applies to all undertakings, or to an unlimited 
number of undertakings chosen on the basis of objective 
criteria.103 Neither the number of recipients, nor the diversity and 
size of the sectors to which they belong can exclude selectivity “if 
not all economic sectors can benefit” from said measure.104 The 
crucial issue is that the measure in question favors “certain 
undertakings . . . in comparison with other undertakings which 
 
97. Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für 
Kärnten, 2001 E.C.R. I-8384. 
98. Joined Cases C-106/09 P & C-107/09 P, Comm’n v. Gov’t of Gibraltar, 2011 I-
11113, para. 72. 
99. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, § 4. 
100. MARCO COLINO, supra note 40. 
101. Commission Common Position (EC) No.  9-1984, 93.  
102. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 117 
(emphasis added). 
103. Id. para. 118. 
104. Id. 
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are in a legal and factual situation which is comparable in the light 
of the objective pursued,” provided there is no justification.105 
In some cases, legal criteria may determine that a measure is 
reserved for specific beneficiaries. When that happens, selectivity 
is de jure and is easy to prove. However, there are also scenarios 
in which objective criteria in fact benefit certain companies.106 
This is known as de facto selectivity, and happens inter alia when 
public authorities have discretion over general rules.107 The CJ 
refers to a three-step selectivity analysis. The first step is to 
identify a framework of reference. The second step involves 
determining whether the measure is a derogation from that 
framework. The third and final step requires analyzing whether 
the measure might be justified by the nature or the general 
scheme of the reference system (in which case it would be 
lawful).108 These principles have been relied upon by the EC in the 
decisions relating to tax rulings, and are therefore particularly 
relevant for the purposes of this Article.109 
Exactly what constitutes selectivity in fiscal measures has 
been subject to some debate. For instance, the EC and the GC have 
defended the legality of tax exemptions intended to encourage the 
use of non-renewables,110 but the CJ disagreed,111 insisting that it 
is the effects and not the objectives that matter.112 More recently, 
in 2015 the CJ confirmed a Commission decision that had been 
annulled by the GC relating to tax deductions given to Spanish 
companies on the goodwill from their shareholdings in foreign 
 
105. Case C143-99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für 
Kärnten, 2001 E.C.R. I-8384, para 41. This is the definition of material selectivity. This is 
opposed to regional selectivity, which favors certain regions within a country. An 
analysis of the latter is beyond the scope of this paper. 
106. Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 121. 
107. Case C–241/94, France v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-4551, 1 C.M.L.R. 98, para. 18 
(1997). 
108. Joined Cases C-78/08 to 80/08, Paint Graphos v. Ministero dell’Economia e 
delle Finanze, 2011 E.C.R. I-7611, para. 65. 
109. See infra Part IV. 
110. Case T–210/02, British Aggregates Ass’n v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II–2789, para. 
61. 
111. Case C–487/06, British Aggregates Ass’n v. Comm’n, 2 C.M.L.R. 10, paras. 85-86 
(2008). 
112. In a similar vein, a corporate tax reform which in effect favors offshore 
companies constitutes illegal State aid. See Joined Cases C–106 & 107/09 P, Comm’n v. 
Gov’t of Gibraltar, 2011 E.C.R. I–11113, paras. 107-108 (setting aside the judgment of the 
GC, joined cases T–211 & 215/04, 2008 E.C.R. II–3745). 
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companies.113 The conditions for the deductions were selective, 
according to the EC, since they amounted to a derogation from the 
corporate tax rules applicable to all Spanish corporations. The 
effect of the system was that companies investing in overseas 
companies received an advantageous treatment. The GC focused 
on the required criteria, and since these could potentially be met 
by every company, it found the scheme to be lawful.114 However, 
for the CJ, the key issue was the effect of acquiring shareholdings 
in foreign, as opposed to national, companies.115 In its view, 
selectivity ought to be assessed by considering whether the aid 
“introduces, between operators that are, in the light of the 
objective pursued by the general tax system concerned, in a 
comparable factual and legal situation, a distinction that is not 
justified by the nature and general structure of that system.”116 It 
requires a derogation from the ordinary tax system which in 
effect leads to a differentiated treatment of operators, regardless 
of whether the operators which meet the conditions are in a 
“comparable factual and legal situation” to the rest.117 
Another recent disagreement between the GC and the CJ 
related to the legality of the Spanish Tax Lease System, a tax relief 
scheme coordinated by banks for shipping companies that 
purchased ships from Spanish shipyards. In fact, the direct 
beneficiaries were Economic Interest Groups (“EIGs”) that acted 
as intermediaries for their members, who ultimately received the 
tax benefits. The EC found the system to be selective, because the 
relief only applied to designated investments and only in ships. 
For the GC, since ultimately the investors benefitted from the 
advantages, and all operators purchasing vessels could be eligible, 
the system was not selective.118 However, the CJ confirmed that 
the concept of State aid does not depend on the legal status of the 
 
113. Case T–219/10, Autogrill España, SA v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:939, para. 90 
(Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Autogrill España]; Case T–399/11, Banco Santander SA v. 
Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:938, paras. 92-93 (Apr. 11, 2014). 
114. Autogrill España, supra note 98, paras. 61-62. 
115. Joined Cases C–20/15 P & 21/15 P, Comm’n v. World Duty Free Group SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para. 68 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
116. Id. para. 60. 
117. Id. para. 67. 
118. Joined Cases T–515/13 & 719/13, Spain v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2015:1004, 
para. 148 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
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undertakings nor the techniques used to grant the benefits.119 The 
advantages may have been transferred to the members of the 
EIGs, but the EIGs themselves were the direct beneficiaries. 
The above reflection reveals that some bright lines have 
already been drawn by the European courts when it comes to 
assessing the existence of a selective advantage. In practice 
however, its presence largely depends upon case-specific 
nuances. As a consequence, venturing to predict the outcome of a 
case is an inherently risky endeavor, as the GC’s tax rulings 
judgments reiterate.120 
III. TAX RULINGS AND THE TAX DEALS OF MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANIES 
A. Understanding Tax Rulings 
The EC defines tax rulings as “comfort letters issued by tax 
authorities to give a company clarity on how its corporate tax will 
be calculated or on the use of special tax provisions.”121 They are 
also known as advance pricing arrangements (“APAs”), since they 
amount to binding administrative decisions on the tax applicable 
to transactions which have yet to be carried out. This anticipated 
character is the reason why Leslie Wayne et al. have fittingly 
described APAs as being “like taking your tax plan to the 
government and getting it blessed ahead of time.”122 Tax rulings 
originated in the United States, and have been embraced by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) and its members.123 They have thus become 
 
119. Case C–128/16 P, Comm’n v. Spain and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, para. 46 
(July 25, 2018). 
120. See infra Part IV. 
121. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5880, Commission decides 
selective tax advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are 
illegal under EU state aid rules (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5880 
[https://perma.cc/XY9H-BKT2] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020). 
122. Leslie Wayne et al., Leaked Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax 
Deals in Luxembourg, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Nov. 5, 2014). 
123. See, e.g., OECD, HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES – 2017 PEER REVIEW REPORTS ON THE 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX RULINGS (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/harmful-tax-practices-2017-peer-review-reports-on-
the-exchange-of-information-on-tax-rulings-9789264309586-en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HGK9-JQX8]. 
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commonplace around the world and, as the EC itself recognizes, 
need not constitute State aid. They may be perfectly lawful, and 
are frequently used by companies needing to allocate profits 
across various jurisdictions in order to predict how their intra-
group transactions will be taxed.124 
There is no standard format for APAs. They are individually 
tailored for each company and are subject to significant 
variations, making the concept somewhat of a hodgepodge. As 
Liza Lovdahl Gormsen explains, the concept catches a “wide range 
of administrative instruments that aim at certainty, each with 
their own rules” which can be understood in the context of 
“avoiding disputes and preventing genuine double taxation.”125 
Indeed, legal certainty lies at the heart of their adoption.126 There 
is a persuasive logic in the argument that uncertain tax policies 
discourage investment,127 because they can become risky and 
thus undesirable.128 Yet the importance of certainty may be 
overrated, and the idea that risk can be entirely removed is at 
best naïve.129 While tax matters are the exclusive competence of 
each country’s tax administrations, and theoretically they have 
the power to consent to even flagrant tax elusion strategies, there 
are certain limitations to their discretion. Overlooking that APAs 
may run counter to the EU’s State aid rules serves to illustrate 
that the sense of certainty these arrangements provide is far from 
bulletproof.130 
 
124. See Theorodos Iliopoulos, The State Aid Cases of Starbucks and Fiat: New 
Routes for the Concept of Selectivity?, 16 EUR. STATE AID L. Q. 263, 265 (2017). 
125. GORMSEN, supra note 17, at 1. 
126. The Notion of State Aid Notice states that tax rulings are offered “[f]or reasons 
of legal certainty.” Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra note 62, para. 
169. In a similar vein, Diller et al. define them as “instruments that offer legal certainty on 
a specific tax issue associates with a future business activity”. See Markus Diller et al., 
Boone or Bane? Advanced Tax Rulings as a Measure to Mitigate Uncertainty and Foster 
Investment, 26 EUR. ACCT. REV. 441, 442 (2017). See also Iliopoulos, supra note 124, at 
264. 
127. See Diller, supra note 126; Rainer Niemann, The Impact of Tax Uncertainty on 
Irreversible Investment, 5 REV. OF MANAGERIAL SCI. 1, 1 (2011). 
128. James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 237, 237 (1998). 
129. For a discussion of the relative value of legal certainty, see Isabel Lifante-Vidal, 
Is Legal Certainty a Formal Value?, JURIS. (2020). 
130. See infra Part V.A.3. 
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B. The Tax Arrangements of Multinational Enterprises 
To understand why tax rulings might be problematic, it is 
necessary to understand the kinds of tax schemes they often 
sanction. The above description of APAs,131 as instruments 
providing tax certainty for companies needing to distribute 
profits across countries, accurately suggests that these 
arrangements will be particularly valuable for multinational 
enterprises (“MNEs”) who have dealings in several jurisdictions. 
As the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) has acknowledged, 
MNEs have at their disposal “many devices—often highly 
complex, interlocking, and very effective—by which to reduce 
their total tax bills.”132 In this Subsection, the complex setups of 
corporations branched out over multiple jurisdictions (the usual 
beneficiaries of APAs) are discussed. 
1. The Risks of Transfer (mis)Pricing 
Transactions within MNEs account for more than 60 percent 
of global trade. Taxing these operations correctly is therefore a 
crucial endeavor for any economy.133 The process of allocating 
profits (mainly for tax purposes, but also for other matters) 
between the different branches or parts of MNEs is known as 
transfer pricing.134 John Neighbour provides an illustrative 
example of the concept: 
Consider a profitable UK computer group that buys micro-
chips from its own subsidiary in Korea: how much the UK 
parent pays its subsidiary—the transfer price—will 
 
131. See supra Part III.A. 
132. IMF, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, IMF Policy Paper 8 (May 9, 
2014). 
133. John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing: Keeping It at Arm’s Length, OECD OBSERVER 
NO. 230, (Jan. 2002), 
https://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it
_at_arms_length.html [https://perma.cc/3W4H-XFH4]. 
134. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KING, TRANSFER PRICING AND CORPORATE TAXATION (Springer 
2008); INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, TRANSFER PRICING AND INTRA-GROUP 
FINANCING (Anuschka Bakker & Marc M. Levey eds., 2012); ROBERT FEINSCHREIBER & 
MARGARET KENT, TRANSFER PRICING HANDBOOK: GUIDANCE FOR OECD REGULATIONS (Wiley 
2012); FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(Wolfgang Schön & Kai A. Konrad eds., 2012). 
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determine how much profit the Korean unit reports and how 
much local tax it pays.135 
Among the perks of globalization for the business 
community is the possibility to “shop around” for lenient tax laws, 
thereby significantly reducing their tax bills.136 One obvious 
temptation is to use transfer pricing to allocate a big portion of 
the profits to jurisdictions with low tax rates.137 This would lead 
to what Shane Darcy calls transfer mispricing,138 and it is one of 
the principal reasons why Ireland, the Netherlands or 
Luxembourg are attractive for multinationals. For instance, the 
Irish corporate tax rate is twelve and a half percent, while in the 
United States it is twenty-one percent. Companies are thus drawn 
to engage in what is known as corporate or tax inversion, which 
implies transferring stocks or assets to a foreign corporation “to 
reduce tax and regulatory costs.”139 According to the EC, the 
temptation to assign reduced profits to high tax jurisdictions 
“could lead to exaggerated transfer prices which should not be 
accepted as a basis for calculating taxable income.”140 
Manipulating profit allocation is particularly straightforward 
for firms whose main source of income stems from intangible 
property, such as intellectual property (“IP”) rights.141 This 
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136. Mike Collins, The Pros and Cons of Globalization, FORBES (May 6, 2015), 
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explains why big tech and pharmaceutical companies are 
frequently the beneficiaries of the strategies hereby described. 
Thomas Pearson explains, for instance, that: 
MNE Groups often attribute research and development 
(R&D) expenses to higher-tax countries which provide 
immediate expensing of these R&D costs.
 
However, in reality, 
the R&D costs of producing IP may be widely dispersed 
among related entities. Subsequent transfer prices charged 
through royalty fees to affiliate MNEs often fail to adequately 
adjust for the real risk premium assumed in the original 
development of the IP.142 
But the tax tactics of some multinationals are not simply 
designed to obtain a better tax deal. These companies sometimes 
profit from legal lacunae and misalignments between the tax 
systems of different countries to elude taxes. The “arrangements 
exploiting differences in the tax treatment of instruments, entities 
or transfers between two or more entities” are known as hybrid 
mismatches.143 They can be used for domestic tax base erosion 
and profit shifting (“BEPS”), defined by the OECD as “tax planning 
strategies used by multinational enterprises that exploit [hybrid 
mismatches] to avoid paying tax.”144 A classic example would be 
the so-called “double Irish sandwich” arrangements, infamously 
used by companies such as Apple or Google.145 
What did it take to prepare a double Irish sandwich? The 
essential ingredients included: (1) the low corporate tax rates of 
some EU Member States; (2) the further rate reductions available 
in Europe on certain IP-related income; (3) bilateral agreements 
preventing double taxation entered into by the United States and 
the relevant European countries; (4) some tax havens, like 
Bermuda, and (5) a legal loophole, namely the mismatch in tax 
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145. See, e.g., MICHAEL THOM, TAX POLITICS AND POLICY 113 (Routledge 2017); Stephen 
C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY’S L. J. 
825 (2011). 
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residence rules between the corporate tax laws of the United 
States and Ireland.146 Luyang Liu provides a very accurate recipe: 
The first step is for the US corporation (“US Co”) to transfer 
some intangible property rights . . . to an Irish subsidiary (“IR 
Co A”) that is incorporated in Ireland but has its headquarters 
located in Bermuda or other tax havens with no income tax. 
This company is not designed like this by accident, but with 
the intention of making the best of the differences in tax 
residency determination rules between the then Ireland tax 
law and the US tax law. Irish tax law provides that a company 
is a tax resident where its central management and control is 
located, not where it is incorporated. So, IR Co A is a Bermuda 
resident (or a tax resident of other tax havens), and not a tax 
resident in Ireland. However, the [US Internal Revenue 
Service] treats IR Co A as an Ireland company since it is 
incorporated in Ireland, which allows it to make full use of all 
the US treaties with Ireland and Ireland’s 12.5% corporate 
tax rate, which is one of the lowest corporate tax rate in the 
world. Additionally, according to US tax law, IR Co A must pay 
the US Co the arms-length value of intellectual property, and 
this royalty income is exempted from US corporate taxes 
under US - Ireland Treaty for US Co, because an Irish 
company, IR Co A, is in control of the intellectual property. 
The next step is to create another Irish subsidiary (“IR Co B”), 
which is wholly owned by IR Co A and is a tax resident of 
Ireland. IR Co A then licenses intellectual properties to IR Co 
B in exchange for royalties. IR Co B then sub-licenses the 
intellectual properties to some companies outside of the US, 
and report royalty income to Ireland, but thanks to Ireland’s 
low corporate tax rate and the ability to deduct the royalties 
paid to IR Co A, IR Co B ends up paying only a “nominal 
amount in taxes.” On the other hand, IR Co A also only pays “a 
low or nil rate of taxation in Bermuda” for its royalties 
received from IR Co B. 
Ultimate ownership of both IR Co A and IR Co B is located in 
the United States and therefore they are subject to the [US 
Internal Revenue Service]’s Controlled Foreign Corporation 
regulations. The payments between the two related Irish 
companies might be non-tax-deferrable and subject to 
 
146. Loopholes “provide corporations with abundant opportunities to minimize 
their tax liability.” Wang, supra note 137, at 541. 
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current taxation. However, this could be avoided if IR Co B is 
not a corporation, but a pass-through entity like a 
partnership, so that it can hide its finances from the [US 
Internal Revenue Service]. This is possible because a 
company may choose either to be treated as a corporation or 
a pass-through entity for tax purposes through the “check the 
box” rules. If the subsidiary elects to be a passthrough entity, 
it is treated as a branch of the parent company for tax 
purposes. Therefore, the payments between IR Co A and IR 
Co B are not subject to current taxation.147 
A Dutch or Luxembourger twist could be added to the 
sandwich to shrink the tax burden even further,148 in practice 
resulting in what the OECD has called “double non-taxation.”149 As 
an illustrative example of the impact of these structures on the tax 
bills of their beneficiaries, in 2011 Apple (which benefitted from 
the Double Irish) paid a tax rate of 9.8 percent on its profits, while 
Wal-Mart (who did not) paid twenty-four percent.150 The 
arrangements leading to drastic tax reductions may have been 
somewhat suspicious, but they were hard to contest from a legal 
standpoint. This was particularly so when they came sanctioned 
by a tax ruling—meaning the tax authorities of the countries 
enabling these setups were well aware of these practices, and 
condoned them. As the EC has explained, these rulings sometimes 
endorse: 
. . . artificial and complex methods to establish taxable 
profits for the companies. They do not reflect economic 
reality. This is done, in particular, by setting [transfer prices] 
that do not correspond to market conditions. As a result, 
most of the profits . . . are shifted abroad, where they are also 
not taxed . . . 151 
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2. The Harmful Effects of the Tax Schemes of MNEs 
The tax tricks of MNEs have been a source of concern for the 
international community for decades. Countries that do not have 
the capital or technology for their economies to flourish may rely 
on low tax rates to attract foreign investment as a shortcut to 
economic growth. The low tax carrot thus serves to lure overseas 
firms to move part of their business to their territories. However, 
this can lead to harmful tax competition, as it serves to trigger a 
race to the bottom—where “countries go on cutting the taxes they 
impose on foreign investors until the benefit they derive is 
reduced to zero.”152 Moreover, the migration of intangibles 
carried out to reduce taxes is detrimental for the high tax 
jurisdictions whose corporations are investing abroad.153 Michael 
Littlewood identifies two main issues: first, the ensuing decrease 
in economic activity leads to inter alia job cuts, and second, 
government revenue takes a plunge, since there is less taxpayers’ 
money.154 A study by Eric Bartlesman and Roel Beetsma 
calculated that, in 2001, the manipulation of profit allocation via 
transfer pricing by MNEs cost the US$53 billion.155 
Transfer pricing and BEPS may amount to abusive tax 
avoidance, which has “no business purpose other than tax 
avoidance.”156 The expertise of the architects behind these 
operations, their complexity, and the fact that they happen within 
groups of companies, often complicate the detection of such 
abuses.157 However, they jeopardize the proper functioning of 
fiscal institutions, and are thus considered detrimental in the 
developed world and in developing countries alike.158 
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3. Traditional Means to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition and Tax 
Avoidance 
The eradication of “harmful tax competition” features 
prominently in the global agenda. The United States adopted 
legislation to combat the woes of transfer pricing already in 
1928,159 and many other jurisdictions followed suit, particularly 
since the 1990s. By 2005, forty countries had regulated these 
practices,160 but given their inherently transnational nature, 
national solutions are not always well suited to address them. 
They have thus been also addressed in bilateral treaties. Most 
importantly, the OECD that has become “the main multilateral 
forum on tax issues through its work on solving double taxation 
problems caused by the impact of differences across tax systems 
on entities and individuals operating in more than one 
jurisdiction.”161 Its work focuses mainly on tackling tax havens 
and preferential tax regimes.162 The prominent role of the OECD is 
unsurprising, since many of its members are the high tax 
countries suffering the damaging consequences of profit 
allocation manipulation in their own skin. However, portraying 
the issue as a matter of rich countries versus poor countries is an 
inaccurate oversimplification.163 In fact, in the context of the 
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developments covered in this Article, the jurisdictions that 
enabled the problematic tax schemes also happen to be in the 
OECD. These issues equally affect the EU, which has taken various 
strands of action beyond the application of State aid. The EU 
initiatives to combat corporate tax elusion are the subject of the 
next Part of this study.164 Here, the focus of the discussion is the 
work of the OECD. 
There are globally accepted mechanisms in place to address 
profit allocation manipulation tactics, most notably the ALP 
defined in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
further developed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.165 
Essentially, the ALP states that transfer prices should equate 
those which would have occurred if the operation had instead 
involved two independent companies, and would thus have been 
dictated by market forces instead of tax benefits. In fact, the EC 
also favors the ALP: 
. . . tax administrations should only accept transfer prices 
between intra-group companies that are remunerated as if 
they were agreed to by independent companies negotiating 
under comparable circumstances at arm’s length.166 
The ALP suffers from certain shortcomings. For starters, it 
emerged in the context of tangible, manufactured goods, in 
relation to the raw materials needed for their production, but is 
now being applied to impalpable IP intra-group transfers.167 It is 
also very broad, and needs a specific calculation method. Among 
the most common methods are transactional methods, which 
assess “transfer prices . . . by transaction basis rather than 
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considering the aggregate financial impact,” and valuation 
methods, based on net worth.168 Determining which system is 
best for each transaction has been the subject of disputes in the 
EC tax rulings investigations.169 These are discussed below.170 
Moreover, for the ALP to function adequately, tax authorities and 
MNEs must work together in good faith. Unfortunately, this is not 
always the case,171 leading commentators to posit that the 
“international tax system has failed to prevent multinational 
enterprises from avoiding paying corporation taxes in 
jurisdictions where they operate.”172 
C. The Momentum for Action 
Revelations about the obscure tax practices of MNEs173 
caused public outrage in the 2010s. In April 2012, the New York 
Times published a piece entitled How Apple Sidesteps Billions in 
Taxes, exposing the tech company’s intricate but profitable 
Double Irish tax strategy.174 Two years later, in November 2014, 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (“ICIJ”) 
released the Luxembourg Leaks (“LuxLeaks”), a database 
containing a “confidential cache of secret tax agreements 
approved by Luxembourg authorities, that provide tax-relief for 
more than 350 companies around the world.”175 Among the best-
known names were Amazon, FedEx, Guardian Media Group, IKEA, 
Skype, or Vodafone.176 Simultaneously, various Group of 8 (“G8”) 
political leaders have outspokenly condemned these 
arrangements,177 widely considered “instruments for aggressive 
tax strategies and undesirable tax avoidance.”178 
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By the time the LuxLeaks were published, the tax rulings of 
various EU Member States were already under the EC’s radar. But 
the scrutiny of the tax rulings is only one in an array of strategies 
to combat these issues. Both the OECD and the EU have taken 
various strands of action, including the adoption of legislation. 
The mounting pressure coerced the Irish government to 
announce changes to its tax laws in order to kill double Irish 
arrangements for good.179 These were implemented by 2015.180 
Moreover, in January 2020 Google’s parent company Alphabet 
confirmed that it would no longer be relying on the double Irish 
to distribute its profits among jurisdictions.181 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STATE AID LAW TO TAX RULINGS: FIAT, 
STARBUCKS AND APPLE 
The EU has very limited room to maneuver when it wants to 
intervene in direct taxation issues.182 At the same time, given the 
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potentially harmful implications of corporate tax matters for the 
general goals of the Union, since the late 1990s it has relentlessly 
attempted to put the tools at its disposal to good use, and take 
effective action. Its unyielding interest has led pundits to wonder 
whether the “narrative” of harmful tax competition may be used a 
“political instrument for rekindling attention in a previously 
neglected policy area.”183 The two main strands of action are 
legislation (both soft law and binding harmonizing initiatives) 
and State aid. Both are covered here, with particular emphasis on 
the latter, after a brief explanation of the origin of the EU’s power 
to interfere with aspects of direct taxation. 
A. The EU’s Tax Concerns and Competence to Act 
Direct taxation is, in principle, an exclusive competence of 
the EU Member States. This means that national governments 
retain full sovereignty over this area, and are free to establish 
their own tax strategies, subject to international rules and any 
bilateral treaties they may have entered into. This does not mean, 
however, that the hands of the EU institutions are completely tied 
in this field. The regulatory framework allows for some, albeit 
limited, intervention. Any initiatives have to be targeted at 
pursuing the general objectives of the EU Treaties, and will 
naturally only affect the Union’s 27 all-European members 
(rather than the OECD’s 37). 
It is reasonable for the Union to want to tackle the problems 
relating to the manipulation of intra-group profit allocation 
previously described.184 Harmful tax competition between the 
Member States could be a source of undesirable tensions, thus 
posing a threat to the stability of the integration process. 
Moreover, tax avoidance can clearly affect the economic 
prosperity of the Union. The EU’s power to act ultimately stems 
from Article 3(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), 
which lists among the principal aims of the EU the “sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
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price stability, a highly competitive social market economy.”185 
Until 2009, the Treaty on the European Community (now the 
TFEU) contained a list of activities that could be carried out in 
order to achieve those goals. It referred to, inter alia, removing 
obstacles to free movement, and “ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted.”186 To this end, the EU 
institutions would be entrusted with the “approximation of the 
laws of the Member States required for the functioning of the 
common [now internal] market.”187 
Soft law and binding legislation may be adopted “to exercise 
the Union’s competences.”188 Among the former are 
recommendations and opinions, which state a position on a 
matter considered important for the Union, and (in the case of 
recommendations) propose a line of action. As for the latter, the 
question arises as to how it would be possible to issue a 
mandatory legal act in the field of direct corporate taxation, when 
it is not a Union competence. A fundamental provision in this 
regard is Article 115 TFEU. It allows the Council to “issue 
directives189 for the approximation of such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the internal market.”190 This 
means that the Council can compel the members of the EU to 
make changes to their national laws if these bear a direct impact 
on the much-coveted fruit of the integration process. 
Consequently, if fiscal provisions affect this purpose, the EU can 
arguably step in and adopt legislation forcing its members to 
introduce legislative amendments to fix the issue(s) at stake and 
guarantee the protection of the internal market. Unanimity is 
required to adopt directives relying on Article 115 TFEU.191 It has 
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served as legal basis for the tax laws that have been adopted to 
date, including the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.192 
The fundamental principles of EU law also play a key role 
here, in particular the principles of supremacy and of subsidiarity. 
According to the former, “[w]here Union law exists, it is supreme 
in relation to national law, and will prevail in the event of . . . any 
conflict.”193 The latter implies that “in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level 
or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.”194 
On the basis of these objectives, tools and principles, it is 
possible to identify three lines of action at the EU level regarding 
direct taxation. These are: soft law, harmonizing legislation, and 
State aid rules. The first two are briefly discussed below. The 
third forms the core of the analysis conducted in this Part of the 
Article. 
B. Regulating Direct Taxation at the EU Level 
The lack of homogenous rules on corporate direct taxation 
across Europe can hamper the internal market. The disparities 
can act as an obstacle to free movement of goods, people 
(including workers) and capital.195 The attempts to iron out the 
differences via binding legislation and soft law seek neutrality, 
that is, “to minimize the effect of taxes on private economic 
decisions.”196 
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1. Non-Binding Measures 
Already in the late 1990s, the Council published an EU Code 
of Conduct for Business Taxation.197 While not legally binding, it 
acknowledges the importance of coordinated action to combat 
harmful tax competition, tax avoidance and tax evasion, 198 and 
stresses the need to prevent losses from tax revenue—all of this 
with a view to protecting the internal market. Its main concern 
centers around those systems that offer special tax advantages for 
non-residents, so as to lure them into doing business in their 
territory. In addition to setting out some criteria to determine 
when tax competition might be harmful,199 the Code of Conduct 
includes a commitment of “standstill” and a commitment of 
“rollback”: the Member States will not introduce new measures 
amounting to harmful tax competition,200 and will amend any 
existing ones that might be detrimental.201 Interestingly, the Code 
refers to the possibility of applying State aid to damaging 
measures, and pledges to publish guidelines on the application of 
these rules to direct business taxation.202 Its adoption led to the 
creation of a Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) in March 
1998, and the publication of a list of harmful tax measures just 
over a year later.203 
In January 2016, the EC launched an Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package, undoubtedly the most important step to date in this 
area.204 The impetus of this development came from the OECD’s 
Action Plan on BEPs, propelled by the leaders of the Group of 20 
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(“G20”) in 2013.205 In the Action Plan, the OECD aimed to “provide 
countries with domestic and international instruments that will 
better align rights to tax with economic activity,”206 and suggested 
specific actions, with references to deadlines, resources and 
methodologies for implementation.207 Importantly, in addition to 
various communications and recommendations and a study of 
aggressive tax planning,208 the Package also put forward 
legislative proposals. In particular, it anticipated changes to the 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation and, fundamentally, it 
tabled the draft of what would become the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive.209 The binding legislation is discussed below, in the 
subpart relating to harmonization. 
On July 15, 2020, the day the Apple judgment was handed 
down by the GC, the Commission adopted a new Tax Package,210 
with three documents: (1) an Action Plan,211 with initiatives to 
inter alia help Member States enforce tax rules and ensure 
compliance, so as to guarantee tax revenue; (2) a proposed 
revision to the Directive on Administrative Cooperation,212 mainly 
extending tax transparency rules to digital platforms;213 and (3) a 
Communication on Tax Good Governance to consider how the EU 
can enhance transparency and fair taxation (including by revising 
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the Code of Conduct).214 In all of these initiatives there are 
frequent references to the work of the OECD.215 
2. Harmonizing Legislation 
The first direct taxation-related area in which EU secondary 
legislation was adopted, dating as far back as in 1977, was that of 
cooperation between the tax authorities of the Member States.216 
The logic for this move was that increasing transparency would 
help minimize the risks of tax avoidance. Moreover, regulating 
inter-agency cooperation is politically more acceptable than 
tampering with substantive aspects of indirect taxation 
regulation. It should be remembered that this is an area in which 
the Member States are hesitant about EU interference, and thus 
the EU institutions need to tread lightly. In 2011, the Directive on 
Administrative Cooperation was passed,217 with a view to 
ensuring “that all taxpayers pay their fair share of the tax burden, 
irrespective of where they work retire, hold a bank account and 
invest or do business.”218 The Directive covers information 
exchanges between the Member States relating to tax matters, 
effectively setting up an automatic information exchange system 
to collect data on income earned by non-residents.219 That 
information is then transmitted to the countries where the 
taxpayers reside.220 In 2014, the scope of the Directive was 
expanded so that interest, dividends, account balances and sales 
proceeds from financial assets would also be included.221 In 2018, 
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new mandatory disclosure rules were introduced,222 effectively 
incorporating the OECD’s Mandatory Disclosure Rules into EU 
law.223 
The most important step towards the harmonization of 
direct taxation laws to date is the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, 
adopted in 2016 as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package.224 It 
was passed by unanimity in the Council, relying on the powers 
conferred on the EU institutions by Article 115 TFEU. Given the 
sensitivity of the area, a detailed justification for the Directive’s 
enactment is provided, invoking the impossibility to tackle the 
problem at the national level and insisting on the full respect to 
the principle of subsidiarity:225 
Considering that a key objective of this Directive is to 
improve the resilience of the internal market as a whole 
against cross-border tax avoidance practices, this cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting 
individually. National corporate tax systems are disparate 
and independent action by Member States would only 
replicate the existing fragmentation of the internal market in 
direct taxation. It would thus allow inefficiencies and 
distortions to persist in the interaction of distinct national 
measures. The result would be lack of coordination. Rather, 
by reason of the fact that much inefficiency in the internal 
market primarily gives rise to problems of a cross-border 
nature, remedial measures should be adopted at Union level. 
It is therefore critical to adopt solutions that function for the 
internal market as a whole and this can be better achieved at 
Union level. Thus, the Union may adopt measures, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in 
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, 
this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order 
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to achieve that objective. By setting a minimum level of 
protection for the internal market, this Directive only aims to 
achieve the essential minimum degree of coordination within 
the Union for the purpose of materialising its objectives.226 
The Directive compels the Member States to introduce five 
measures in their tax regimes: limits on interest deductions,227 
exit taxation,228 general anti-abuse rule,229 controlled foreign 
company rule,230 and tackling hybrid mismatches.231 The EU 
countries had until January 1, 2019 to transpose the Directive 
into their national laws by making any required legislative 
amendments, but in January 2020 six of them were issued with a 
formal notice for not having complied with the deadline.232 The 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive was amended in 2017 to cover 
hybrid mismatches arrangements with third countries.233 That 
same year, the Tax Dispute Resolution Directive was adopted to 
facilitate settling tax related disputes.234 The Member States must 
resort to compulsory and binding arbitration, committing to 
solving the issue within a specified time frame and with the 
possibility of going to court as a last resort. 
C. The EC’s Application of State Aid Law to Tax Rulings 
The pivotal regulatory steps described above are forward-
looking: they aim at avoiding future problems by compelling the 
Member States to take action. As such, they are undoubtedly the 
most powerful weapon against tax competition and tax 
avoidance. However, they do not have retroactive effect, and 
cannot be used to hand out substantial bills for unpaid taxes to 
 
226. Anti Tax Avoidance Package, supra note 204, para. 16. 
227. Id. art. 4. 
228. Id. art. 5. 
229. Id. art. 6. 
230. Id. art. 7-8. 
231. Id. art. 9. 
232. For an analysis of the Directive, see Peter Koerver Schmidt, The Role of the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive in Restoring Fairness—A Proper Step towards Ensuring 
Sustainability of the International Tax Framework?, in TAX SUSTAINABILITY IN AN EU AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (C. Brokelind & Servaas van Thiel eds., 2020). 
233. Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 Amending Directive (EU) 
2016/1164 as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries, 2017 O.J. (L 144) 1. It is 
mentioned by the OECD on its website, since it affects its members. 
234. Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on tax dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the European Union, 2017 O.J. (L 265/1). 
432 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
those that, in the past, may have manipulated their profit 
allocation, or relied on hybrid mismatches to avoid taxes. By 
contrast, State aid law provides an opportunity to dig into the 
past: if the APA endorsing a corporation’s tax scheme is contrary 
to Article 107(1) TFEU, then any associated benefits would 
constitute illegal State aid, allowing the EC to oblige the relevant 
company to give back the advantage received by paying the taxes 
it would normally have owed. But the principal reason for 
resorting to these provisions resides not in their retroactive 
potential. Contrary to the field of direct taxation, State aid law is 
an exclusive competence of the EU.235 As a consequence, it 
furnishes the Commission with much broader enforcement 
powers, and their exercise does not require the consent of the 
member States. 
The EC first started investigating the “sweetheart deals” 
offered by national tax authorities to MNEs in 2013, a year before 
the LuxLeaks scandal hit the spotlight,236 and coinciding with the 
OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS.237 By the end of 2014, a general 
information inquiry into tax rulings had extended to all Member 
States.238 As of August 2020, twelve specific investigations had 
been launched,239 of which eight had already concluded.240 In 
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seven of these cases, the EC found that there was unlawful State 
aid.241 According to Vestager, the tax systems sanctioned may 
“artificially reduce a company’s tax burden,” and are therefore 
“not in line with EU state aid rules. They are illegal.”242 On appeal, 
thus far only once, in Fiat, has a finding of illegal State aid been 
upheld by the GC.243 The positions of the EC and the GC provide an 
accurate predictor of the viability of State aid as a tool to combat 
detrimental tax competition and tax evasion. It should be noted 
however that the CJ has not yet issued any rulings on the 
application of State aid to APAs. Appeals against the judgments of 
the GC in Fiat and Apple were pending at the time of writing.244 
1. The Tax Systems Endorsed 
The investigation into Fiat’s tax scheme related to an APA 
granted by Luxembourg in 2012 to the company Fiat Finance and 
Trade (“FFT”), sited in its territory. FFT offers financing and 
treasury services to other Fiat companies located in different 
parts of Europe.245 According to the EC, the tax ruling “endorses a 
method for arriving at a profit allocation to FFT within the Fiat 
group . . . and enables FFT to determine its corporate income tax 
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liability to Luxembourg on a yearly basis.” 246 The transactional 
net margin method (TNMM) was used to calculate the taxable 
profits,247 since according to the tax advisor it was the most 
appropriate manner of applying the ALP.248 This was because FFT 
only performed financial services, and only to Fiat group 
companies that “do not receive any similar type of services by 
third parties,”249 therefore making an internal comparison 
impossible. What would need to be determined is the “net 
margins that would have been earned in comparable transactions 
by independent enterprises.”250 With a view to applying the 
TNMM, FFT segregated its capital according to the different 
activities it engaged in, and its taxable profits did not include “the 
portion of FFT’s equity it designated as supporting FFT’s financial 
investments in [Fiat Finance North America (“FFNA”)] and [Fiat 
Finance Canada (“FFC”)].”251 
In the case relating to Starbucks,252 the tax 2008 ruling of the 
Dutch tax administration was issued in favor of the company 
Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (“SMBV”), controlled by the 
Starbucks Corporation—the “only wholly controlled Starbucks 
group entity outside of the US which roasts coffee.”253 The 
purpose of the APA, which had a duration of 10 years, was to 
establish the remuneration of SMBV for the functions it 
performed. It would consist of a “mark-up of [9-12%] of the 
relevant cost base,”254 mainly production and distribution related 
costs, such as personnel and equipment. The cost of consumables 
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(such as cups, napkins or beans), and of services provided by 
third parties, were excluded. The APA also accepted the royalty 
payments for the use of Starbucks’ coffee roasting IP and know-
how would be “deductible for corporate income tax purposes and 
. . . not subject to Dutch withholding tax.”255 On the basis of this 
remuneration, SMBV’s taxable profits were calculated relying on 
Dutch corporate income tax, and applying the TNMM. 
With regard to Apple, the Irish revenue issued a tax ruling in 
1991, and a revised version in 2007.256 Both related to the tax 
systems of Apple Sales International (“ASI”) and Apple Operations 
Europe (“AOE”). The former bought Apple products from all over 
the world and sold them in Europe, Middle East, Africa and India. 
Since customers were contractually purchasing the goods from 
ASI, all the related profits were recorded in Ireland.257 The latter 
manufactured computers, such as iMac desktops and MacBook 
laptops, for the Apple group.258 According to the Irish law in force 
at the time, ASI and AOE could be incorporated in Ireland without 
being tax residents there, since they were managed and 
controlled by Apple Inc., a tax resident in the US.259 Their profits 
were internally assigned (through transfer pricing relating to IP 
rights licensed to ASI and AOE) to their head offices, but these 
lacked “any physical presence or employees and [were] not 
located in any jurisdiction,”260 and did not have the capacity to 
generate income from trading. This income thus amounted to 
“ocean profits,” not subject to taxation either in the US or 
Europe.261 In 2011, of ASI’s US$22 billion in proceeds, only 
around EU€50 million were taxable in Ireland.262 That is how its 
effective tax rate was calculated by the EC to amount to about 
0.05 percent, dropping even further in subsequent years.263 
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2. Application of Article 107—State Imputability, State Resources, 
Affection of Intra-EU Trade and Distortion of Competition 
The Commission had no problem finding that the contested 
rulings were imputable to the State, since the issuing authorities 
are part of the tax administration of the relevant EU countries.264 
It also easily concluded that the APAs involved State resources. 
While there was no positive transfer of funds, tax exemptions give 
“rise to a loss of State resources,” which also falls within the scope 
of Article 107,265 as previously discussed.266 The requirement that 
intra-Union trade be affected was equally met in all three cases: 
the relevant companies are globally active and operating in all EU 
Member States and therefore “any aid in [their] favour is liable to 
affect intra-Union trade.”267 Competition could be distorted 
because the APAs relieve these companies of tax liability they 
“would otherwise have been obliged to pay” under the ordinary 
taxation rules, thereby improving their financial position vis-à-vis 
competitors.268 
3. Application of 107—Selective Advantage 
Unsurprisingly, the tricky issue in all of these cases was 
whether there was a selective advantage. In order to apply State 
aid law to these tax rulings, the EC had to resort to innovative 
arguments. It is here where the GC found, on two out of three 
occasions, that the EC had not done enough to demonstrate an 
advantage had in fact been conferred. 
The analysis of the existence of an advantage and its 
selective character appears intertwined in all of the decisions. The 
three-step test to assess selectivity discussed above (identifying a 
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framework of reference, demonstrating the existence of a 
derogation from that framework, and considering possible 
justifications) is used.269 According to the EC, when assessing tax 
measures, a derogation from the reference system should be 
sufficient to identify an advantage for the beneficiary.270 Given the 
specificities of the decisions, each case is discussed separately. 
a. Luxembourg’s Tax Ruling in Favor of Fiat 
The EC used as the reference system “general Luxembourg 
corporate tax system in the form of the Luxembourg corporate 
income tax rules” for all corporations, without making a 
distinction between integrated and non-integrated companies 
(i.e. those which are part of a group, and those which are not).271 
The APA amounted to a derogation from the system because it did 
not respect the ALP, since it lowered the company’s tax liability in 
Luxembourg “compared to non-integrated companies whose tax 
base is determined by the profits they generate under market 
conditions.”272 An advantage existed because this was a specific 
measure (as opposed to a general scheme), and it could be 
considered presumptively selective.273 The argument of the EC in 
this regard was that because the APA was not a scheme, and 
therefore not part of the usual framework, it furnished FFT with 
an advantage because it was in a better position than it would 
have been under normal market conditions.274 
The Commission found that, while in this specific case the 
TNMM would be the correct method to apply the ALP, it had not 
been adequately relied upon. The problem rested on the choice of 
profit level indicator. In particular, all of FFT’s capital should have 
been taken into account, and subjected to a single rate.275 In the 
related press release, the EC explained that FFT operates like a 
bank, so its taxable profits should be determined similarly (by 
calculating the “return on capital deployed . . . for its financing 
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activities”).276 As a consequence of the flawed application of the 
TNMM, the capital base calculated was lower than FFT’s actual 
capital, and the remuneration applied to the same was much 
lower than market rate.277 No adequate justification was put 
forward by Luxembourg nor FFT,278 and thus in the eyes of the EC 
all the requirements for a selective advantage were met.279 
b. The Dutch APA for Starbucks 
The reference system was the general Dutch corporate 
income tax system.280 Determining a potential derogation would 
entail assessing “whether the methodology accepted by the Dutch 
tax administration . . . for the determination of SMBV’s taxable 
profits in the Netherlands departs from a methodology that 
results in a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome 
and thus from the arm’s-length principle.”281 Unlike in the Fiat 
case, here the Commission found that the correct technique for 
calculating taxable profit should have been the comparable 
uncontrolled price (“CUP”) method.282 The CUP “compares the 
price charged for property or services transferred in a controlled 
transaction to the price charged for property or services 
transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in 
comparable circumstances.”283 The preference for this method is 
consistent with the OECD’s position, according to which: 
Where it is possible to locate comparable uncontrolled 
transactions to apply it, the CUP method is the most direct 
and reliable way to apply the arm’s length principle. 
Consequently, in such cases the CUP method is preferable 
over all other methods.284 
The use of the TNMM, according to the EC, was based on the 
(wrong) assumption that SMBV was a low-risk manufacturer 
whose main activity was roasting coffee.285 It led to unduly 
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reducing the company’s taxable profit. Moreover, the TNMM was 
also “improperly applied,” because it did not consider whether 
the royalty payment for the licensing of the coffee roasting IP 
respected the ALP286 As a consequence, the ALP was not met, and 
the methodology chosen led “to a lowering of SMBV’s tax liability 
under the general Dutch corporate income tax system as 
compared to non-integrated companies whose taxable profits is 
[sic] determined by the market.” None of the justifications 
suggested by the Netherlands and Starbucks were sufficiently 
substantiated, according to the EC.287 Therefore, a selective 
advantage was found to exist. 
c. Apple’s Tax Ruling in Ireland 
The reference system here was the general Irish corporate 
tax system.288 As in Fiat and Starbucks, the EC pointed out that, in 
the process of demonstrating the second step of the selectivity 
test (the derogation), an advantage would be demonstrated, since 
“where a tax measure results in an unjustified reduction of the tax 
liability of a beneficiary that would otherwise be subject to a 
higher level of tax under the ordinary rules of taxation, that 
reduction constitutes both the advantage granted by the tax 
measure and the derogation from the reference system.”289 It 
found that the taxable profit calculated on the basis of the profit 
allocation methods endorsed by the contested APAs departed 
“from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line 
with the [ALP],” and thus constituted a selective advantage.290 
This was partly because the profit level indicator was that of 
operating costs (rather than sales for ASI and total costs for AOE). 
As a consequence, the annual taxable profit of the companies was 
inadequately lowered, particularly when compared to that of non-
integrated companies,291 thereby reducing the two companies’ 
corporate tax liability.292 Since the EC did not find that the 
derogation could be justified, the tax ruling was considered to 
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constitute illegal State aid.293 The EU€13 billion bill Apple was 
required to pick up is the biggest of any such investigation to date. 
D. The General Court’s Position 
The appeals of these three decisions before the GC had clear 
commonalities. For starters, they all questioned the use of State 
aid rules to condemn individual tax rulings, which in the 
appellants’ view amounted to a breach of the exclusive 
competence of the Member States in the field of direct taxation. 
They also saw in the acceptance of the ALP an attempt to 
implement an alien principle into national law.294 The outcome 
was mostly in line with established case law. The GC agreed with 
the EC’s analysis of the three straightforward conditions of Article 
107(1) TFEU, namely State imputability, effect on trade between 
the Member States, and distortion of competition.295 The bone of 
contention, and the reason why ultimately the EC lost two of the 
cases, was the existence of a selective advantage.296 
The focus of this Section of the Article is assessing the GC’s 
view in relation to (1) whether the disputed decisions amounted 
to disguised tax harmonization and (2) how a selective advantage 
can be demonstrated in cases relating to tax measures. 
1. Disguised Harmonization? 
One of the principal issues at stake was whether the EC was 
entitled to apply State aid law to tax rulings in the first place. 
According to the appellants, this was a harmonization attempt in 
disguise,297 which would constitute a “breach of the fundamental 
constitutional principles of the EU legal order governing the 
division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States.”298 In particular, they invoked the fundamental principles 
of EU law enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 TFEU,299 as well as Article 
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114 (which excludes the possibility of adopting harmonizing 
measures relating to fiscal provisions without unanimity).300 
In this regard, the Commission had cited established case law 
in that “a Member State may not invoke provisions prevailing in 
its domestic legal system to justify failure to observe obligations 
arising under Union law.”301 The GC recognized that direct 
taxation indeed falls within the realm of exclusive competence of 
the Member States. However, the Member States are under an 
obligation to exercise their competence in a manner that is 
consistent with EU law, including State aid rules, as long as the 
conditions for their application are met.302 While in principle it is 
up to each country to decide inter alia the bases of assessment 
and other conditions, if the EC is not afforded any leeway in this 
regard, it would be impossible to apply Article 107 TFEU. As a 
consequence: 
. . . if such a measure in fact discriminates between companies 
that are in a comparable situation with regard to the 
objective of that tax measure and as a result confers selective 
advantages on the beneficiaries of the measure which favour 
“certain” undertakings or the production of “certain” goods, it 
can be considered State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU.303 
The GC was unequivocal that “the Commission merely 
exercised its powers under Article 107 TFEU in examining 
whether the tax ruling at issue complied with the law on State 
aid,”304 and there was no violation of the general principles of EU 
law nor the exclusive competences of the Member States.305 As a 
result, the arguments of the appellants in this regard were 
unsuccessful. While the application of State aid was possible,306 
the GC issued a stark reminder to the Commission that it bore the 
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burden of proof of each of its elements (a cue for its subsequent 
resolution to overrule two of the decisions).307 
2. Demonstrating the Existence of a Selective Advantage 
a. Embracing the Arm’s Length Principle (With Caution) 
Once the general authority of the EC to invoke Article 107 
TFEU had been established, the principal question was how it 
could be applied. The most contentious issue of the judgments 
was whether the Commission was entitled to use the ALP in 
particular, and OECD’s guidance and principles in general,308 to 
consider whether a selective advantage not attainable through 
the ordinary tax system had been afforded. The implication of this 
recognition would be that intra-group transactions would be held 
to the same standard as market transactions between 
independent companies. 
The Member States opposed the use of the ALP.309 Ireland 
insisted that, on the one hand, it was not part of Irish tax law, and 
on the other, “no freestanding obligation” to apply it stemmed 
from Article 107 TFEU or the European case law.310 In all of the 
appeals, the Commission argued that the CJ had previously 
embraced the ALP in the Forum 187 case.311 However, this was 
against a different contextual background. On that occasion, the CJ 
pondered the merits of a Commission decision relating to the 
Belgian tax regime for coordination centers. In the court’s view, in 
order to determine the existence of an advantage in the 
calculation of the taxable profit on the basis of the rules 
applicable to these centers, it would be necessary to compare the 
specific regime with the regular Belgian tax system, and with the 
profits of a corporation developing its activities under normal 
market conditions. The special rules led to subtracting certain 
expenses which would not have been deducted under conditions 
of free competition, hence an advantage existed. The advantage 
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was also selective, because it was only available to certain 
companies.312 
In the tax ruling investigations, the Commission saw in the 
ALP a possibility to identify the counterfactual—that is, to try to 
predict what might have happened to the beneficiary in the 
absence of the tax ruling. Without such comparator, the chances 
of successfully applying Article 107 TFEU would be non-existent, 
since demonstrating the conferment of an advantage would not 
be feasible. The GC accepted the validity of the ALP as a tool 
(rather than a general principle) to determine whether intra-
group profit attribution “corresponds to the level that would have 
been obtained through carrying on that trade under market 
conditions.”313 According to the Court, while the countries may 
not have formally adopted the principle, they were members of 
the OECD, and in their capacity as OECD members they had 
reached a consensus on its pertinence. Specifically, it pointed out 
that the methodology followed to apply Irish tax law was 
consistent with the ALP.314 The GC was thus careful not to derive 
the application of the ALP from EU law, but rather understood it 
as a (tacitly or expressly) accepted principle of the Member 
States’ OECD membership. The Court insisted that the EC had 
rightly pointed out that, while the OECD guidelines are not 
binding: 
. . . those guidelines are based on important work carried out 
by groups of renowned experts, that they reflect the 
international consensus achieved with regard to transfer 
pricing and that they thus have a certain practical 
significance in the interpretation of issues relating to transfer 
pricing . . . 315 
b. Burden and Standard of Proof 
In the context of tax measures, a selective advantage on a 
taxpayer is conferred when it is afforded “a reduction in the tax 
base resulting from a tax measure enabling [that] taxpayer to 
employ transfer pricing in intra-group transactions that did not 
resemble prices that would have been charged in conditions of 
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free competition.”316 The GC accepted the Commission’s 
combined analysis of the existence of an advantage and 
selectivity,317 saying it was “not inconceivable”.318 In fact, in tax 
rulings there would be a natural overlap: the measure would have 
to lead to a reduction in the amount of tax due under the ordinary 
tax regime (showing that the measure improved the financial 
situation of the recipient and conferred it an advantage), and this 
ordinary system is simultaneously what would apply to other 
taxpayers (proving that it is selective as it is not enjoyed by 
undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation).319 
In the Fiat case, the GC found the EC was correct in 
establishing that the application of the TNMM had not been done 
correctly nor having regard to the ALP, because part of FFT’s 
profits had been excluded.320 All of its capital, which was about 
ten times higher than that calculated in the APA, should have been 
considered, and a single rate should have applied to the entirety 
of that capital. If the sums had been done accordingly, the capital 
base would have been about sixty percent higher.321 As a 
consequence, FTT’s liability was significantly lower than what it 
would have had to pay under the general Luxembourg tax system 
(the reference framework for the selectivity analysis), and an 
advantage had been approved.322 
With regard to Starbucks, the first controversial matter was 
the Commission’s position that the transfer pricing method relied 
on by the Netherlands was flawed. In fact, the GC accepted the 
application of the TNMM rather than the CUP, preferred by the 
EC. In this way, the GC afforded significant discretion over the 
interpretation of the ALP to the Netherlands in particular, and to 
the Member States in general should the issue come up again in 
another investigation. If the EC wanted to argue that the CUP was 
superior in this case, it should have demonstrated why. The 
disagreement between the EC and the Netherlands does not imply 
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that the latter is mistaken. Moreover, the Commission failed to 
demonstrate that the transfer pricing method had been wrongly 
applied. The EC’s analysis of the advantage requirement was 
scant and deficient. In this sense, it is not possible to argue that a 
company’s tax burden has been reduced compared to what it 
would have been in the absence of the APA for simply failing to 
comply with the methodological requirement relating to the use 
of the CUP. In order to demonstrate an advantage, the 
Commission would have needed to calculate the results of the 
application of the CUP method. As a consequence, there was not 
enough evidence to prove, to the requisite standard, that the 
alleged errors did not result in a reliable approximation of a 
market-based outcome. 
Moving on to Apple, the principal setbacks for the EC were 
that it did not correctly understand the burden of proof, and thus 
it did not, yet again, provide sufficient evidentiary support for its 
conclusions. In particular, the EC assumed that any profits for the 
Apple Group relating to IP licenses necessarily had to be allocated 
to ASI and AOE in Ireland, since they had no staff outside and thus 
no capacity to operate in any other jurisdiction. However, the 
Commission did not provide any evidence that the Irish 
companies had actually carried out the activities. 323 The GC 
criticized the EC for not “conducting a more detailed analysis of 
the functions actually performed by the [Irish] branches,” and for 
the assumption that those “functions had been performed by the 
permanent establishment.”324 The EC thus understood that, since 
the process of allocating profits to the head office looked 
suspicious, it was for Ireland to prove that the allocation had been 
adequately performed. In fact, according to the GC, the burden of 
proof was still on the EC to show the actual activities of the Irish 
branches.325 
In addition, the EC made an error in the application of Irish 
law, and should have demonstrated that the allegedly faulty profit 
allocation led to a smaller tax burden as compared to the tax 
burden the company would have had to face in the absence of the 
APA. As a consequence of these issues, the GC concluded that the 
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EC “did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard 
that there was a selective advantage for the purposes of 
Article 107(1) TFEU,” and therefore the decision was annulled in 
its entirety.326 
V. STATE AID AS A TOOL TO COMBAT HARMFUL CORPORATE TAX 
PRACTICES: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
“Of course, errors are not good for a chess game, but 
errors are unavoidable and in any case, a game without 
errors, or as they say ‘flawless game,’ is colorless.”327 
The above quote from chess player Mikhail Tal was 
cunningly used by Dimitrios Kyriazis to describe Vestager’s 
aggressive strategy.328 It ingeniously sums up the state of play in 
the EC’s fight against harmful tax practices. Of the GC’s rulings, the 
Fiat and Apple judgments have been appealed before the CJ.329 
This means that the Commission has cut its losses in the case 
against Starbucks and accepted defeat. This might be a wise 
strategy. An appeal would need to refer to points of law, and the 
EC won on the key issues. It thus fulfilled its main objectives, and 
the irony of spending more EU taxpayers’ money in what might 
prove to be a futile attempt at making a company pay (a relatively 
modest amount of) taxes would not be lost on the critics of its 
strategy. In the Apple case however, there is more at stake, and 
the Commission appears to think that it can still win. The 
headlines in the press relating to Apple’s victory might give the 
amateur reader a sense of public humiliation for the 
Commission.330 In fact, however, the main target audience of 
these investigations is not the general public. For the tax advisors 
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of MNEs, and the countries enabling suspicious transfer pricing 
methods, the message will have been loud and clear, and will not 
fall on deaf ears even if the Commission ultimately fails to 
persuade the CJ. 
Before drawing the final conclusions, this Part of the Article 
critically dwells on the main consequences of the progress made 
in the State aid battle against problematic tax rulings. It considers 
the issues on which the EC has claimed victory, the errors it may 
have committed, and the wider impact of these developments on 
EU law in general and EU competition law in particular. 
A. The Commission’s Intended and Unintended Victories 
1. The ALP in the Context of State Aid Law 
“ . . . he came to the conclusion that you cannot depend on 
people, and that you can live in peace only if you keep them at 
arm’s length.”331 
In light of the recent judgments of the GC in relation to 
national tax rulings, it seems that the above conclusion reached 
by Jonathan Noel in Patrick Süskind’s novel The Pigeon might 
prove helpful for multinationals. There is little doubt that the ALP 
is now very relevant in the context of State aid assessment, and 
disregarding it can lead to a finding of illegality of national 
decisions relating to direct corporate taxation under Article 
107(1) TFEU. 
Commentators have strongly criticized the incorporation of 
the ALP into State aid law.332 According to Michael McGrath, for 
instance, “[t]he suspicion among many . . . representatives in 
Ireland, including myself, is that State aid is being used as a veil to 
undermine Ireland’s corporation tax system.”333 In one of the 
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most comprehensive studies to date in the field, Lovdahl Gormsen 
has expressed serious concerns about the incorporation of the 
ALP into Article 107 TFEU in particular, and the EU legal order in 
general.334 The imposition, which disregards whether the national 
systems of the Member States accept the ALP, amounts to forcibly 
incorporating not just the principle, but a specific version of it, 
into domestic tax law. She finds this to run “counter to the rule of 
law.”335 She also finds tax recovery to be “entirely 
disproportionate,”336 and warns about the confusion created by 
having two supranational bodies (the OECD and the EU) 
developing different transfer pricing standards.337 
These arguments are certainly persuasive, and very 
legitimate. It should be borne in mind that, when Lovdahl 
Gormsen’s work was published, the GC’s views on this matter 
were not known, since the cases had not been decided. It is now 
clear that the GC opted to conclude that the ALP does not emanate 
from EU law, and is not an integral part of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
Instead, it is merely an instrument to allow for the practical 
application of this provision, and it comes into play because it is 
internationally recognized and familiar for the Member States in 
the context of their OECD membership. The acceptance of the ALP 
by the EU courts was almost unavoidable if State aid rules were to 
be considered relevant for the assessment of tax rulings. 
It is also important to remember here, besides the principle 
of supremacy,338 the CJ’s clarifications regarding the nature of the 
EU. In particular, the Union “constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which states have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields.”339 In light of this 
recognition, it not far-fetched to conclude that, if a pivotal piece of 
that legal order could be rendered inapplicable to situations 
where it would otherwise be perfectly relevant, the EU 
institutions would be afforded significant leeway to look for 
effective tools to fix that. After all, the stability and economic 
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2020] THE LONG ARM OF STATE AID LAW 449 
prosperity of the Union and its citizens can clearly be affected by 
any practices that significantly drain the resources of the Member 
States. Moreover, the EU law enforcement system offers stark 
assurances in relation to the protection of the rule of law. The EC 
decisions have been subject to thorough judicial review, thus 
dissipating most of the concerns raised by Lovdahl Gormsen. 
The ALP may not be a perfect parameter for establishing the 
existence of an advantage, but no better indicator has thus far 
been proposed. Its limitations must be accepted. The OECD itself 
has recognized that “transfer pricing is not an exact science but 
does require the exercise of judgment on the part of both the tax 
administration and taxpayer.”340 It seems rather exorbitant to ask 
the EC to apply mathematical-like parameters to something that 
is indeed inexact. Moreover, the GC’s recent judgments in 
Starbucks and Apple confirm that Member States have leeway 
when choosing their preferred transfer pricing methodology to 
comply with the ALP. Should the EC want to challenge their 
choice, it alone bears the burden of proof with regard to the 
creation of an advantage. 
In relation to the confusion raised by the parallel work of the 
OECD and the EU, it should be noted that they both work together 
in this field.341 The work of the OECD often refers to that of the 
EU, and there are frequent references to OECD publications in the 
EU’s initiatives. Therefore, rather than confusion, the adoption of 
similar principles might in fact lead to greater convergence and 
clarity. Since the Member States of the EU are also OECD 
members, they would not be unfamiliar with the ALP, regardless 
of whether they have actually taken steps to embrace it in their 
national laws. 
2. Pushing for National Legal Reform 
The State aid route for fighting tax avoidance is only a piece 
of a broader strategy towards fair corporate taxation in the EU. 
The legislation adopted to harmonize national tax regimes and 
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preclude tax avoidance was covered above.342 Tax harmonization 
is naturally the preferred way of tackling these issues, since it is 
the only way to avert the temptation to engage in BEPS 
altogether.343 At the same time, the State aid rules might 
represent a more practical option, given the broad powers 
conferred on the Commission by EU competition law provisions. 
Crucially, the EC investigations into the tax practices of MNEs 
have triggered the introduction of legislative changes in the 
countries where the APAs were issued. Not only did Ireland 
eliminate the double Irish sandwich shortly after the EC started 
looking into Apple’s tax rulings.344 Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, among others, announced reforms to prevent these 
situations from arising in the future—a move Vestager has 
welcomed.345 The recovery of potentially unpaid taxes is less of a 
priority than ensuring that others are unable to resort to similar 
tricks. The pressure exerted by the EC’s multiple investigations is 
thus accomplishing its central goal. 
3. Reducing Predictability 
The usefulness of tax rulings for attaining legal certainty was 
highlighted earlier in this Article.346 Commentators have 
expressed concerns about the unpredictability caused by the 
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interference of State aid, and the incorporation of the ALP.347 Yet 
the importance of certainty may be somewhat overrated, and the 
idea that risk can be entirely removed is at best naïve. Already in 
the 16th century, the celebrated philosopher Voltaire said that 
“doubt is not very pleasant, but certainty is absurd.”348 
Extrapolating this to the tax world, as Rainer Niemann has 
pointed out: 
. . . there is tax uncertainty even if the tax law remains 
unchanged and if an investor has already made all economic 
decisions which are relevant for taxation. The reason is that 
taxpayers, fiscal authorities and tax courts may interpret tax 
laws and economic facts differently.349 
The acknowledgment that APAs may be declared illegal by 
virtue of State aid does not serve to annihilate certainty. Rather, it 
is a stark reminder of its limits. Not even the preapproval of the 
relevant tax authorities may be enough to ensure legality. 
Moreover, the developments to date highlight that tax rulings will 
only be deemed unlawful if they enable MNE groups to misuse 
transfer pricing to unduly reduce their tax bills. This is an 
objectionable practice that should be discouraged. If nipping legal 
certainty renders these tax schemes less attractive, then this 
ought to be considered a positive by-product of the EC’s strategy. 
4. Unintended Outcomes: Probing Resilient Narratives about EU 
Law 
The significance of Apple’s GC victory has been 
unquestionably magnified by the media attention the case has 
attracted. One accidental positive outcome of the saga is that it 
has shone an unusual spotlight on a Commission loss. And not just 
any loss at that—one against a prominent US tech company. This 
development inadvertently casts doubt on some of the 
questionable narratives relating to EU competition law 
enforcement which are all too often drilled into the general 
 
347. Tony Joris & Wout de Cock, Is Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission a Suitable 
Legal Source for an EU “At Arm’s Length Principle”?, 4 EUR. STATE AID L. Q. 607 (2017). 
348. The French original is: “Le doute n’est pas un état bien agréable, mais 
l’assurance est un état ridicule”. Voltaire, Lettre LXX de M. de Voltaire au Price Royal de 
Prusse (Nov. 28, 1770), in OEUVRES COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE VOL 66 (Société Littéraire-
Typographique 1784). 
349. Niemann, supra note 127, at 2. 
452 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
public. The focus here is on two narratives: technology 
protectionism, and the rigor (or lack thereof) of EU judicial 
review. 
a. Technology Protectionism in the Application of EU Competition 
Law 
Just days before the Apple decision was announced, the US 
Department of Treasury issued a White Paper entitled The 
European Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer 
Pricing Rulings,350 putting forward three concerns vis-à-vis the 
investigations into the tax practices of MNEs: (1) the approach is 
new and departs from established case law and EC practice; (2) 
there should not be an attempt to retroactively recover 
purportedly unpaid taxes; and (3) the rationale behind the most 
recent cases is at odds with international norms, thereby 
undermining the international tax system.351 According to the US 
administration at the time, the EC’s decisions risked creating “an 
unfortunate international tax policy precedent.”352 
Recent investigations in various spheres of competition law 
(particularly State aid, merger control, and the abuse of 
dominance) have rubbed salt into the technology protectionism 
wound, that is, the idea that the law may be tactically enforced 
against powerful foreign tech firms so as to favor EU market 
players.353 In 2015, then-President Barack Obama suggested that 
some of the investigations against US firms were mainly, if not 
exclusively, commercially driven: “[w]e have owned the internet. 
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Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it in ways 
that [Europeans] can’t compete. And oftentimes what is portrayed 
as high-minded positions . . . is just designed to carve out . . . 
commercial interests.”354 President Donald Trump was curter 
when he said to former EC President Jean-Claude Juncker of 
Vestager: “your tax lady, she really hates the US.”355 
As Ramsi Woodcock has pointed out, “[t]he casual observer 
could be forgiven for thinking that European antitrust regulators 
have declared war on American tech giants.”356 This is because 
Vestager has not been “afraid to pit the Commission against 
American behemoths and European powerhouses,”357 yet the 
above criticisms are largely unfounded. Countless headlines refer 
to Europe’s war against big tech, focusing on the “who” (Google, 
Broadcom, Amazon, Intel) rather than the “why” (their market 
makes their behavior particularly likely to harm the competitive 
process). As I have argued elsewhere, EU and US antitrust policy 
are fundamentally different, and have increasingly diverged over 
the past four decades.358 Issues like market power and tax 
avoidance may pose a threat to the former’s core values, and EU 
enforcers are prone to taking action to curb any detrimental 
effects. Moreover, there are plenty of investigations targeting 
European companies,359 and therefore the argument that they are 
somehow afforded a special treatment is feeble, if not baseless. 
Against this background, Alfonso Lamadrid has highlighted 
the important political consequences of the Fiat and Starbucks 
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Judgments, which have since been strengthened by the Apple 
ruling: 
. . . the credibility of the Court and of the EU system may be 
reinforced by the fact that—fortuitously—it was only the US 
company (and the Netherlands) getting out of the hook, not 
the European one (and Luxembourg).360 
b. The Thoroughness of the Judicial Review of EC Decisions 
Another powerful narrative shaken by the Apple judgment 
relates to the absence of rigorous judicial review of EC decisions. 
Prof. Damian Chalmers encapsulated this position when he said 
that “[t]he [CJ] has too much institutional investment in the 
development of the European Union to discharge its checks and 
balances role successfully.”361 In Apple, the GC carried out a 
comprehensive analysis of the economic evidence presented by 
the Commission, and pondered whether there was sufficient 
support for the outcome.362 Ultimately, it was not afraid to rule 
against the EC even when the stakes were so high. This is proof, if 
proof were needed, that “the European system of judicial review 
works, no matter the nationality of the companies affected and 
the political interests at stake.”363 While the GC was at times 
critical of the tax schemes endorsed by the Netherlands and 
Ireland, it was adamant that its judgments would not be a case of 
“doing the right thing for the wrong reason.”364 While the dealings 
indeed looked somewhat concerning, if the required evidentiary 
burden to annul them is not met, then they cannot be declared 
unlawful. 
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B. Sharpening the Commission’s Axe: Considerations for 
Improvement 
At the time of writing, the errors on which the Commission is 
basing its appeal of the GC’s Apple judgment had not been made 
public.365 Importantly, the Commission has already been proved 
right on the main points of law, and the losses before the GC are 
by no means catastrophic. On the contrary (pending the CJ’s Fiat 
and Apple judgments),366 it now has the express blessing of the EU 
judiciary to proceed with its investigations into APAs. Likewise, it 
has skillfully made use of its competences to exert pressure on 
the EU Member States to take action against harmful tax 
practices. 
Irrespective of these accomplishments, if the EC continues to 
score losses for failing to meet the required evidentiary burden, 
the media will feast on its defeats, and there is a risk that its 
strategy will lose credibility in the long run. This may in part be 
the reason why the EC has finally decided to appeal its most 
publicized loss. However, perhaps more importantly, the 
Commission ought to reflect on what it can do to go the extra mile 
and either gather sufficient proof, or be more selective when 
choosing its investigations. Particularly, it needs to carefully 
consider the reasons why, in the GC’s eyes, it fell short of 
demonstrating the existence of a selective advantage in both 
Starbucks and Apple. The best way to go about this would be to 
compare the evidence presented in Fiat with that of the other 
cases. As Lamadrid has explained: 
the Commission [may be required] to do a greater job when 
Member States do worse. In other words, the Commission 
cannot simply assume that because the Member State acted 
in a seemingly arbitrary manner the outcome was wrong.367 
The pivotal issue is that only in Fiat did the EC manage to 
demonstrate a deviation from the ALP on the part of the 
Luxembourg tax authorities when issuing the tax ruling in favor 
or FFT. It did so on the basis of laborious analysis which 
effectively showed that, in a counterfactual scenario where the 
APA had not been granted, FFT’s tax bill would have been 
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significantly heavier.368 Overall, the EC may have been overly 
complacent about the burden of proof and the evidentiary 
burden. In the Starbucks case, the EC could have attempted to 
show how the application of its preferred pricing method would 
have led to a significantly different, less advantaged outcome. In 
Apple, an analysis of the actual activities of ASI and AOE might 
have sufficed to prove the arbitrary profit allocation process. All 
of this would naturally have required significant efforts, and it 
may be true that, “[w]hen you are winning even when you lose, 
there is no point in trying too hard.”369 
VI. CONCLUSION 
US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once 
said that “taxes are what we pay for civilized society.”370 
Corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax competition adversely 
affect economic prosperity, and give rise to tensions between 
countries. Differences in tax rates and legal loopholes have 
enticed MNE groups branched out over various jurisdictions to 
play around with their IP-associated profits so as to shrink their 
fiscal obligations. Around the world, governments are joining 
forces to combat these practices, aware that they may only be 
eradicated through coordinated transnational efforts. Since the 
1990s, the OECD and the EU have acted as key fora for springing 
into action. Keeping an eye on each other, they have worked 
towards establishing fundamental principles and issuing valuable 
guidance. The EU has also succeeded in compelling its members 
to adjust their tax laws to thwart transfer mispricing and double 
non-taxation, thereby tackling the root cause. The resulting 
harmonized legislative landscape paints a promising (albeit EU-
wide only) picture of a fairer system of direct corporate taxation. 
Since 2013, the EC has further attempted to counter the 
wrongs of the past by sending MNEs invoices for purportedly 
unpaid taxes, using State aid law to target tax rulings. A 
preliminary look at the GC’s Starbucks and Apple judgments might 
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suggest that, in taking on these giants, the Commission bit off 
more than it could chew. In practice however, this Article has 
shown that the outcome may in fact be a windfall. The EU 
judiciary has given the green light to the State aid route, and has 
furnished the EC with a fundamental tool—the ALP—to 
effectively apply the Article 107(1) prohibition to tax rulings. The 
Commission can thus use an instrument over which it has 
exclusive competence to meddle in a field that had been almost 
entirely cordoned off by the Member States. This achievement in 
and of itself has put a pit in the stomach of both MNEs—whose 
questionable tax schemes have been exposed—and the countries 
enabling these arrangements. The Member States under 
investigation have vowed to change their laws, and ironically, by 
winning the appeals, they lost out on significant sums of 
money.371 The Commission’s resounding defeats are also a poster 
for the thoroughness and impartiality of the EU legal system. 
To really pull off a royal flush, the Commission must now 
fight tooth and nail to meet the required evidentiary burden. It 
needs to show that Fiat was not the exception that proves the rule 
and that State aid cases against tax rulings can be won. The 
deterrent effect of the tactic might otherwise wear off soon. The 
recent implementation of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive is 
likely to avert many instances of corporate tax malpractice, 
reducing the need to prolong the offensive against tax rulings. For 
the time being however, a truce is unlikely. 
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